


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ITS PRICES; ITS VOCATION

By



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
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TO
THE BRITISH NATION

A GRATEFUL HUNGARIAN

PREFACE

IN publishing the present small work on the greatest political question of the day, the author feels that he must, first of all, apologise to the great Nation to whom he has ventured to dedicate it. The British Nation, it is true, is singularly tolerant and affable to foreigners, and has more than once listened with attention to the opinions of men who have dwelt amongst Britons as their guests. Nor will it be, we may hope, considered presumptuous in a Hungarian to assume that, being a Hungarian, he is not quite an alien in England, nor unfamiliar with English political sentiment. Yet it is certain that the question here treated, and the way in which it is led to touch upon subjects of delicate national interests, may expose the author to the appearance of an unwelcome intruder. For this, should it be the case, he here offers his humble apology. He begs to say, with Themistocles, "Strike me, but

listen to me !” It is not from a love of notoriety ; it is from a love of England that the author has thought it his duty to put before the British public his views on Imperialism.

It appeared to him that Imperialism, having so far been approached from every conceivable point of view of home politics, might with advantage be studied from two other and very instructive points of view : from that of General History, and from that of personal experience of the working of types of Imperialism other than British.

There have been various Empires in history. The author is not aware that there exists a comprehensive study of Imperialism as a problem of history ; and yet it is in every question of that kind a matter of no mean importance to try to derive from history such “working hypotheses” as may serve as safe guides in the maze of politics. The author has devoted his life to the study of General History—that is, to the study of those vast Alps among the innumerable mountains and hills of history which determined the minor events of the past. He is convinced that, as the Alps or the Cordilleras were not made by the slow cumulation of countless small heavings of the earth ; even so the leading facts of history, and amongst

them Imperialism, were not produced by "many, many" little causes, but by a few great causes. Broad facts have broad, that is, few, causes. By persistent study of every aspect of the historical phenomenon one may very well arrive at a clear insight into *the* causes of vast facts, such as Imperialism in Rome, in the Catholic Church, in Russia, in America, or in Great Britain.

In the present work the author has essayed to formulate briefly the results of his life-long study of the dominant events and institutions of General History as bearing on the question of Imperialism. He has, as in all his works, laid the greatest stress not on the reading of documents and books, but on his personal acquaintance with the political and social institutions of the different types of Imperialism in Europe and America.

It is with reluctance that the author feels himself compelled to add one more remark. In this country there is a more or less general tendency to depreciate small books on great questions. To but too many people it seems incongruous when questions like Imperialism are treated with what is, in point of size and bulk of letter-press, an appearance of levity and superficiality.

We beg the reader to pause before making inferences from the thinness of the letter-press to

the thinness of the arguments contained in it. We beg him to consider that the more ripely a man has thought over a subject ; the more elaborately he has studied every possible phase and stage thereof ; the more likely he is, provided he is honest and no erudite *poseur*, to formulate his results in the simplest and briefest of language. Bulky books on subjects such as Imperialism are, unless they are meant to be mere reference-books of data, a sure sign and proof of the unreadiness and incapacity of their authors. One will never be in a position to write a complete history of Bristol in less than three or four bulky volumes ; but in a hundred years or so, history proper will be advanced enough to enable some one to write a satisfactory history of England in one moderate volume.

May I take this opportunity to thank the ladies and gentlemen who have in the last two years attended my lectures, for their goodness and fairness to a student of history who is frequently of an opinion not agreeable to their views?

EMIL REICH.

LONDON, 33, ST. LUKE'S ROAD, W.

February 22, 1905.

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IMPERIALISM*

PART I
INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

IT is easy to divide Politics into Home and Foreign Policy ; and no one is unacquainted with these terms. It is, we fear, not so easy to tell in every concrete case which question belongs to which part of policy, to home or to foreign. Of the great political questions at present agitated there is probably none that engages the interest of British and non-British people more than that of Imperialism. Everybody feels that really, at the bottom of most things bearing on the life of the great nations of Europe, America, and Asia, the driving force is either Imperialism or forces enlisted in combating Imperialism. But is Imperialism a matter of Home Policy ? Or does it belong to Foreign Policy ? Or is it a mixture of both ?

If Imperialism is a matter of Home Policy, then we may feel pretty confident that all its problems will adjust themselves in time and in proper order without much ado, and without much risk of any one's committing grave blunders. In British home

policy, at any rate, the danger of spoiling the chances of success has never been very great. Practically safe from attack since the times of Philip II. of Spain, in the sixteenth century, Great Britain has, since 1660, certainly since 1688, seen no serious internal trouble; and whether one Administration consisted of men wiser or less wise than other Ministers, home matters were not likely to be either hopelessly compromised by the inefficiency, or hurriedly precipitated into fundamental reforms by the talents, of British statesmen.

In British home matters one can afford to wait. There is no particular danger in delay, nor any special advantage in superior wisdom. Since 1707, when, through the union with Scotland, Great Britain reached her more or less complete equilibrium at home, the rest of the internal problems were left to slow "evolution." Blunders, if made, were corrected, partly by contrary blunders, partly by process of a slow wearing out. Should therefore Imperialism belong to home policy there is no serious reason why not to give Mr. Chamberlain's, or any one else's, scheme a fair chance. In that case Imperialism would be no more than the series of Acts by which, beginning with Grenville's Act in 1770, various proposals were made to settle the question of contested

elections. Grenville's Act proved fairly useful, but not quite so. Other Acts were passed, and finally the question of contested elections has been left to the ordinary law-courts.

But if, on the other hand, British Imperialism is a matter, or largely a matter, of Foreign Policy, then the possibility of blundering becomes an exceedingly grave question. Both in home and in foreign policy great blunders may and have always been made; but while in home policy they were but rarely fraught with grave dangers, in foreign policy even apparently slight blunders entail most serious, frequently irreparable, losses. A negative answer instead of an affirmative one; the despatch of Mr. A. instead of Mr. B.; participation in or abstention from a war; any delay; any wrong information on the state, policy, army, or navy of another great or even small Power,—all this and innumerable more things may bring about the most appalling consequences.

It is not difficult to point out examples in quite modern history. Austria is at present in a pitiful plight. Many outside critics are convinced that she will, after the death of the present Emperor-King, automatically fall to pieces. Others are equally certain that she will be swallowed up by Germany. However that may be, it remains

certain that Austria, if not Austria-Hungary, is in a state unworthy of her secular *rôle* in history. Most people are inclined to seek for the reasons of that downfall of Austria in the most varied quarters. Yet if we only firmly grasp the truth that broad facts have broad causes, it is not very difficult to see that Austria, always dependent more on her foreign than on her home policy, has come to her present plight by one single mistake in her foreign policy, made in one single minute of one single day in 1870. Had Austria, regardless of consequences, at once attacked Germany in July 1870, at the outset of the Franco-German War, she could under no circumstances have lost her rank as a Great Power of the first order. However, Austria did not join the French. In the very minute that this abstention was determined by the Emperor-King, Austria was automatically sinking to the level of a second-rate Power; and by losing her true leverage she began to toss about miserably in her sea of internal disturbances. It is unnecessary to point out the fateful blunders in the foreign policy of Napoleon III., in 1864, 1866, and 1870. It is likewise superfluous to remind the reader of the absurd, and, in their consequences, terrible blunders in the foreign policy of Louis XV. The matter is too well known.

If, then, British Imperialism is a matter of British Foreign Policy, then indeed the greatest precaution is advisable and necessary. By the nature of foreign policy, tentative or half measures are, quite in contrast to home policy, not feasible, or not easily so in Europe. In foreign policy, if anywhere, we must admit and act up to the dictum: *Une porte est ouverte ou fermée*. At any rate, we must do so in the long run. There is scarcely any exaggeration in saying that nations with a clear-sighted and steady general plan in their foreign policy have the greatest chances of ultimate success. Foreign policy must be clear in aim, as it must be based on solid information about and insight into the resources and aims of the other Powers.

There is little doubt that Great Britain did have such a steady and general plan from William III. to the battle of Waterloo. It was based on clear principles both in what England did not want to do (*e.g.* to acquire large provinces on the Continent); and in what England did want to do (*e.g.* to expand imperially outside Europe). But can we say this much of Great Britain's foreign policy at present? Is there such a clear and steady foreign policy?

Before the year 1871, Europe, Africa, and Asia were, from the standpoint of International Policy, essentially different from what they have come to

be at present. The expansion of Russia in Northern and Central Asia, the rise of the Japanese, the unity and imperialisation of Germany, the unity of Italy, the colonisation of nearly all Africa—all these new circumstances have most materially altered the aims and methods of foreign policy in general. Has British foreign policy correspondingly adopted her new steady and clear plan intended to meet the altered bearings and drift of international policy? Is British Imperialism, as far as it is, by hypothesis, mainly British foreign policy, a well-outlined and well-planned scheme of great life?

One may well doubt it. In saying this, no silly reproach is meant. On the contrary a question is asked, the answer to which is far from easy. In fact, the answer seems so difficult that unless we find some safe guide in the facts of the past we cannot very well hope to evolve it by sheer logical or political penetration. What the foreign policy of Great Britain shall be—or, more simply, what British Imperialism is to mean—this, we take it, can be answered only after a mature consideration of Imperialism in the past and in empires other than the British. If it should be possible to derive from the study of past and also from that of non-British Imperialism in the present some real insight into the nature of that great driving force

and still greater responsibility, then indeed one might be in a better condition to appreciate and judge adequately British Imperialism and British Imperialists and their schemes.


This is the plan here followed. In Part II. of the present pamphlet it is attempted to sum up plainly yet fully such causes, influences, and prices of Imperialism as can be clearly learnt from an attentive study of general history. These causes and prices being manifold, Part II. will be subdivided into various sections dealing with (I) Imperialism and Man, (II) Imperialism and Woman, (III) Imperialism and Religion, (IV) Imperialism and Intellect.

On the basis of the insight won from a general study of Imperialism in the past, we shall then, in Part III., try to apply the principles so obtained to that *novum*, to the British Empire, which constitutes an essentially new and highly differentiated form of Imperialism. In pursuing our study in this fashion we shall finally be able to see whether British Imperialism is, or is not, a mixture of constitutions referring to both Foreign and Home Policy—that is, whether the third of the above classifications of Imperialism is nearer the truth than either the first or the second.



PART II

*PRINCIPLES OBTAINED FROM THE STUDY
OF GENERAL HISTORY*



I

IMPERIALISM AND MAN

CLASSIFICATION OF EMPIRES

IT is more or less natural that men have at all times imagined themselves to be the makers of their own history. Whether the citizens of a small state, a large realm, or a still larger empire, men have been flattering themselves upon few things more than upon their own political success. Their state, they think, has been produced by their own innate forces; by some mysterious racial quality, by virtue of which they are and always were far stronger, more intelligent, more just, and hence more successful than other nations. Nor have even the greatest writers of national history seriously attempted to correct this erroneous notion.

At the present day when the Germans daily prepare for an historic deed even greater than the one they achieved a little over thirty years ago, their foremost teachers and writers

foster in them an incredibly fanatic belief in "Teutonic" superiority by nature, by "race" quality, by destiny. What they have done was, of course, exclusively their own merit; what they will do will likewise be the effect of their irresistible national force.

It is even so with all other nations. The idolisation of the word "America" by every American; their boundless belief in the immense superiority of everything American, either now or in the near future,—all this forms the groundwork, the chief mental pabulum, the principal guide and leading star of every one citizen of the States. To cast doubt on it is to attempt to extinguish the sun, or to swallow the ocean. It is ridiculous; it is unworthy of serious attention.

Yet with all due deference to the prejudices so necessary, we admit, to all national greatness, there is no statement less confirmed by history than the belief above sketched. The history of each nation is, in reality, binary. It is the outcome of conflicts with other nations, much rather than the result of an innate greatness. When the nations to be combated were puny, the nation combating them also remained puny. The real prayer of each nation ought to be:

Lord, give us worthy enemies! What has all the talent of the Hungarians availed them, since unfortunately most of the nations surrounding them were people of third-rate importance? Given a favourable geographical situation, the next and vital point is favourable—that is, very dangerous—neighbours. In combating them, a nation will, through those very conflicts, and provided nature has fairly equalised chances, become what without those conflicts she could never have become.

These conflicts compel one nation to concentrate in city-states; others in a territorial monarchy; others again, in a spiritual state; finally, others, in a vast Empire. Empires are not matters of choice; they are matters of geographical and historical (or, more briefly, geo-political) circumstances. It is flattering to think that one's empire was built up by the great and proud forces of one's national will. But it is not true. Empires, like small city-states, are the resultants of circumstances that cannot be controlled, that do not admit of a free choice. They must be obeyed, or otherwise they entail the heaviest penalties.

No Roman ever seriously thought of an Empire before the second century B.C. The Roman Empire was not deliberately made by the Romans; it was the Romans who were absolutely forced into

the building up of the greatest and most typical lay empire of all times. Had they not done so, the Carthaginians would have done it. Had the Carthaginians failed, the Macedonians would have done it. The Mediterranean countries were, since the third century B.C., bound to coalesce or to be united in a vast empire—Roman, Carthaginian, Macedonian, or other. The Romans got the prize; but they did not create it.

It is even so with the American Empire, or the United States. When, through the war of 1755 to 1763, the Colonials in America had taken full cognisance of the vast Hinterland, west of the Alleghany Mountains; when they began to see that this immense Hinterland was both easily accessible to agriculture and industrial labour, and teeming with untold wealth; when then they saw that George III. absolutely forbade them, by the Proclamation of October 7, 1763, to enter upon and possess themselves of that incomparable Hinterland,—they could not hesitate for one moment in their choice of measures. To obey George III. was to disobey the strongest instincts of men. Accordingly, the Colonials, seeing that their future was in their Hinterland, and not in London, and being most effectively aided by France, cut loose from England.

As soon as that was done, it became evident that if that Hinterland was to be really utilised by the Colonials it must be under one common government. The distances were far too immense, the helplessness of the solitary farmer far too manifest, to admit of the establishment of detached and straggling states. It was moreover quite on the cards that the fabulous wealth of that Hinterland could not be taken possession of except in the absence of all civil strifes, wars, and similar conflicts, that have driven Europe into the acceptance of, at times, over two thousand different governments.

And so, under the impulse of the strongest human desires, and obeying the clear behests of the geographical nature of North America, the Colonials at once formed an Empire, which has finally come to be washed both by the Atlantic and the Pacific, and in size is equal to Europe. Had Nature rolled as insurmountable obstacles in the way of the Colonials in the north, as she has to Colonials in the southern continent of America, the very idea of an Empire could not have arisen.

The very same geographical reasons have long forced the Russians to expand into Northern and Central Asia, as early as the sixteenth century; and to advance slowly, but persistently, to an open sea. And since such a sea, as geography wills

it, can only be secured by them by the previous conquest of huge territories, lying as it does at an enormous distance from the centre of old Russia ; the Russians have, in the last three centuries, necessarily formed an Empire, in that their inevitable and indispensable condition of national life could be secured only by efforts on a very great or imperial scale. As against the Poles, the Russians always had the great advantage of being practically unmolested in the north and east, whereas the Poles were attacked on all the four sides.

The Russian Empire is thus the only possible solution in the east of Europe, given the actual geographical nature of that part of the continent. Had the Russians not succeeded in establishing it, the Poles, Turks, or Swedes would have done it. Into the making of the Roman Empire history entered for a greater share than did geography ; into the making of the Russian Empire, as well as of the American Empire, geography claims a greater share than does history. In all the three cases, however, an Empire was, and in two of them still is, an inevitable phenomenon. It may be deplored or admired ; it cannot be thought accidental, or a product of deliberate will.

The reader is already prepared to hear that the

British Empire too is a necessity, and not the result of mere plans, schemes, adventures, exploits, or any other apparently free action of man. Ever since 1066, certainly ever since 1154, England has clearly been Imperialist, in fact or in intention.

If one compares the history of France with that of England proper, it becomes at once evident that, while France for centuries after 1066 was still broken up into a great number of autonomous territories belonging to kings, dukes, margraves, earls, and barons; England after 1066 offers, through the conquest of William I., a practically united territory from the Tweed to Land's End. The territorial unity of England dates from 1066; the territorial unity of France dates from 1766. Even in 1766 there were a few small foreign *enclaves* in France.

This territorial unity of England clearly enabled the first Norman kings to think of expansion outside England—that is, to think imperially. This was more than facilitated—in fact, it was made necessary by the circumstance that the Normans, who conquered England, were dukes of Normandy. After 1154 the King of England had an Empire proper. Half of modern France owed allegiance to him; part of eastern Ireland belonged to him; and the Scotch were not quite independent of him.

On the maintenance of this vast and most valuable Empire the kings and the people of England spent, with interruptions, the next three hundred years, from 1154 to the battle of Châtillon in 1453, by which Guienne was lost to the English, so that only Calais remained English until 1558.

For three hundred years, then, the Government and people of England were engaged in vast imperial conflicts. The Normans rightly felt that their hold on England would be much safer by the resources of imperial provinces outside England. They were thus driven into Imperialism in order to consolidate the extraordinary success of the Battle of Hastings.

No sooner had imperial expansion in France proved to be unfeasible (1453) than a new and totally unforeseen circumstance drove England into an imperial career of a still greater horizon. In 1492 Columbus discovered what later on was found to be a huge continent full of riches and new possibilities. Through that discovery Columbus changed the entire geo-political position of England. From having formerly been at the extreme end of the European world, England now slowly woke up to the fact that she was really in the centre of the world. No Englishman ever rendered England a service so immense.

More than that. It is indeed quite evident that nearly every one great event of the sixteenth century was quickened into life by the incomparable achievement of Columbus. The Reformation broke out in Germany in 1517, and more particularly after 1519, because the German territorial princes, in view of the apparently boundless power of Charles V., ruler of most of western Europe and of America, were afraid that he would degrade them to mere provincial officials. Without Columbus's discovery the princes would not have dreaded Charles V. Without the aid of the princes of Germany, Luther could have had no more success than had had Hus. The Germans have never made political revolutions from bottom upwards. This they did only in matters intellectual and artistic.

As in Germany, so in Spain the chief cause of events spells Columbus. The Spanish people, determined to appropriate the vast territories and treasures of their newly discovered world, did not join the Reformation, in that they clearly saw that with religious wars at home the American and other conquests could not be realised. They therefore readily submitted, with apparently fanatic bigotry, to the Catholic Church, to the Inquisition, to the monks, so as to have peace at home and free scope

in America. Spanish bigotry in modern times and all its consequences were thus the inevitable result of the feat of Columbus.

No long proof is needed to show that in sixteenth-century France too the principal and ultimate cause at work is Columbus. In the first half of that century (up to 1558) France was surrounded by ultra-Catholic Spain on all sides; Philip of Spain, subsequently the Second, having married the Queen of England, and being Lord of the countries to the south, east (Franche-Comté), and north-east (Spanish Netherlands) of France. Spain, hitherto relatively unimportant to France, was now, thanks to America, her most serious antagonist. Naturally many Frenchmen were, up to 1558, driven into Huguenotism; and had England remained Catholic and allied with Spain, all the French would have become Protestants. However, England in 1558-61 became Anglican; and it was therefore necessary for France to remain Catholic. The question was fought and intrigued out in France from 1559 to 1593, when Henry IV. turned Catholic.

In now turning to the influence of Columbus on England, we have no hesitation in saying that Columbus, together with William the Conqueror and Simon de Montfort, has revealed as well as

given to the English their real destiny—Imperialism. The English of the sixteenth century were, *au fond*, dominated by one great desire only—the desire, both natural and legitimate, to avail themselves of the unparalleled opportunities afforded to them by the discovery of Columbus and other Spanish, Portuguese, and some English navigators.

Slowly but unfailingly the English of the Tudor period learnt to appreciate the fact that North America, at any rate, was *their* natural “sphere of influence”; and that for the trade in the east they had facilities in no way smaller than those of the Spanish, Portuguese, or Dutch. It became more and more galling to them to note the glorious career of the people of little Holland and little Portugal, while they themselves lagged behind. But, like the Spanish, the English could not seriously think of establishing an oversea empire in North America, without having found their equilibrium at home.

In the sixteenth century, with the Spanish spectre constantly before them, they accepted Tudor autocracy for the same reason that the Spanish acquiesced in the tyranny of Philip II. When, however, the Spanish might was becoming more and more evanescent, the English, learning from the example of the successful Dutch revolt before

them, first settled all home questions in the seventeenth century by civil war and parliamentary conflicts, and then, in the eighteenth, entered upon the task of establishing an oversea empire.

The civil war and most of the conflicts of Parliament from 1660 to 1702 were centred in the Puritan section of the people. Puritanism in England aimed at the very same thing that ultra-Catholic bigotry in Spain meant to secure: equilibrium at home, in order to devote the country's forces all the more freely to Empire-building abroad. The Puritans devotedly sang of the Empire of the Lord. In reality they sang for the British Empire. Historically speaking, Puritanism is the same phenomenon as Spanish ultra-Catholicism. Puritanism is far richer in antagonisms and conflicts, and hence more likely to stimulate thought and progress. But historically it is on a line with the Spanish means of securing free scope for Imperialism.

The dominating fact, then, of English history is its Imperialism, dictated by the least changeable of all influences—by England's geo-political situation in the world. No doubt untold thousands, nay, millions, of bygone English disliked the idea of Imperialism, and when brave John Eliot thundered against the "Sejanus" of Charles I. he took his example from Roman imperial history only to cast

upon it all the contumely that his noble heart was capable of.

This, however, does not alter the fact that Eliot himself is, historically, as much one of the builders of the British Empire as is Warren Hastings or Cecil Rhodes. Without men like Eliot, England could not have settled her home questions in the seventeenth century, although she was sure of producing such men. And without her equilibrium at home, she could not, in the eighteenth century, have devoted her forces to the work of Empire-building. As Eliot preceded Cromwell, so he is the antecedent of Chatham. The drift for Imperialism has been, as we saw, secular in England.

By nature England was, before the time when the wealth of her coal mines was fully appreciated, a poor country. By some industries and a system of taxation that did not admit of exemptions as on the Continent, the English kings had, it is true, an ample revenue. Yet it was evident, both from the Spanish and Dutch wars, and from the requirements of colonisation, that England must, in self-defence, possess a very strong fleet. In the seventeenth century England had a population of between 6,000,000, and 7,000,000 people. This was evidently too small to draw therefrom a revenue sufficiently large for the maintenance of a first-class

fleet. This could only be done by accumulating great wealth more rapidly than had been possible before. This again was tantamount to intense over-sea trade—that is, to Empire-building.

In those times, with industrial resources in their infancy, oversea trade alone, as the example of the Dutch clearly showed, could bring to the country a wealth sufficiently large for the maintenance of a naval power of the first order, together with its indispensable complement—a great merchant fleet. In 1690, as well as in 1779, England's coasts were attacked by French and Franco-Spanish fleets. To place before England a rampart of invincible vessels, an Empire with boundless resources was needed.

The same reason that prompted the Norman and Plantagenet and Lancastrian kings of England to conquer France, prompted the English people to fortify their country by a world-empire. What the battles of Crécy and Agincourt meant to the kings of England in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar meant to the English people in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In both cases the same reflection was made. England alone is not endowed with sufficient resources to defend herself against powerful aggressors. Islands never are. Not one of the large islands in Europe has ever been able

to hold its own for any length of time, unless it succeeded, like Venice, in building up a strong Empire. The islands of Crete, Rhodes, Cyprus, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and Ireland were all alike unable to stave off the conqueror. So was England in the early Middle Ages ; and it was only when England finally learnt the lesson of geo-politics, that islands must be Imperialist or otherwise be annexed by a great continental power, that England became really strong and important.

At present we are witnessing another example of this fundamental truth of geo-politics. The Japanese are quite right in holding that they must form an Empire. Being only a group of islands accessible on all sides, they must surround themselves by the one force that is always "on all sides" or ubiquitous—that is, by sea-power. This means they must have an Empire. So far, so good. However, unfortunately for the Japanese they imitate the English in the Middle Ages and the Swedes in the seventeenth century ; in that the Japanese now attempt to build up that indispensable Empire of theirs on the continent of eastern Asia, or, more properly speaking, in Russian, or semi-Russian, territory. In this they will ultimately fail, as did the English and the Swedes in quite similar enterprises on the Continent.

What the Japanese ought to have done was to build up an island Empire in the Pacific. The Philippine Islands they might probably have bought of the Americans ; other innumerable islands might have been exchanged, conquered, or "inevitably annexed," from the Dutch, Portuguese, and other possessions. The heroism of the Japanese is not a consequence of *bushido*, or any other quality of the "soul" of that nation. But *bushido* is a consequence of the arrival of Russia in the Far East, a political circumstance ; and of the island nature of Japan, a geographical fact.

More briefly, then, what has driven the Japanese into Imperialism is a profound alteration in their geo-political situation. Their Empire, like that of the Romans, Americans, Russians, or English, is not a matter of choice, of proud free will, of innate "racial" superiority, but of fatal necessity. It cannot be otherwise. An individual man in England may be called, or call himself, a "Little Englander" ; he may in ever so violent language thunder against the "grab" and "greed" of Imperialism : he will remain an Imperialist all the same. It is written all over his face, in the very calm and unemotional expression of his face ; in his lack of gestures ; in his tastes ; in his likes and dislikes ; in his stern and passionate interest

in Religion ; in his lack of the sense of Art—a sense which had his ancestors possessed it to a greater extent, they could not have made the British Empire ; in every nook and corner of his soul, of his being. ?

How many times has it not been remarked by Continentals, as well as by English people coming home from the Continent, how radically different the English are from the Continentals ! Precisely ; radically indeed. The English have these eight hundred years been prompted and pushed, impregnated and energised, by a force practically unknown on the Continent : by Imperialism. The English are Imperialists ; the Continentals are not, or only trying to be so. This is the whole difference. It is a difference indeed ; one that goes down to the very tap-root of all things social, public, religious, or financial. It colours or discolours everything ; it intensifies or relaxes everything ; it changes the very atmosphere of things.

Not any alleged “race” quality, Anglo-Saxon, Anglo-Celtic, or other, has impressed its fiat on the features, physical and moral, of the English ; their secular Imperialism has done it. Their very physical features are clear evidence of it. They have, on the whole, imperial faces : sharp, stern, imposing, with prominent noses, little hair, bony, sinewy. Like

their country, each of them is an island, unapproachable, *ours*, uncommunicative ; yet fully aware that public virtues (*ἀρεταὶ κοινωνικαί*) must bind them all together in an imperialist unit. Taine has essayed to build up the history of the intellect of England by reducing the moving forces to Race, *Milieu*, Moment. This is handy ; but only handy. The truth is that the English intellect, as well as every other feature of English life, has been influenced by nothing more profoundly than by the greater or lesser wave of Imperialism constantly surging over England since William the Conqueror.

If then, Imperialism is, as will be seen later on in much greater detail, not merely a political scheme, which leaves the rest of the intellectual, emotional, or religious life of the individual untouched ; if Imperialism be, as it undoubtedly is, a Scheme of National Life, embracing and influencing every one aspect of public or private life, then we must indeed be very careful in distinguishing the various kinds of Imperialism. For there *are* several kinds.

To jumble British Imperialism together with Roman, Russian, American, or Japanese Imperialism, is absurd.

The Romans had an Empire, and so have the British. But these two Empires differ most essentially. They have, of course, certain fundamental features

in common, as we shall see. Some of the consequences of Imperialism are so vast, so penetrating, that every one Empire has manifested them. Yet there are deep differences between Empires ; and it is only by grasping the individual and distinctive nature of the British Empire quite clearly that we may hope to secure a safe foundation of further thought on Imperialism as related to the British Empire.

In trying to give a short classification of Empires, we are at once struck by their geographical difference. The British Empire is not continuous or contiguous. It is straggling over all latitudes ; it has no continuous boundary line. It is of all climes, of all nations, of all degrees of civilisation. The Roman Empire was, the American and the Russian Empires are, composed of one continuous territory, encompassed by one unbroken frontier.

This alone constitutes a vast difference in structure. But when we add that the British Empire consists of some sixty million white people, mostly British, and several hundred million non-white people ; when we furthermore consider that the real soul of the British Empire, in numbers, money, intellect, and general moving force, is centred in a little country, not quite the size of Hungary, in the United Kingdom,—then we see at once that the

British Empire is in many ways essentially different from either of the three other great Empires.

In the Roman Empire, comprising as it did all the Mediterranean and nearly all the Atlantic countries, we have, to the present day, the classical type of the lay Empire proper. Over a hundred million people, mostly very civilised and old historical nations, were dwelling in that Empire, in the territory of which there was no break, no interruption. Since the second decade of the third century A.D. all free inhabitants of that Empire were Roman citizens; and most of them had enjoyed that great privilege of Roman citizenship already in the first century A.D. Their political and legal organisation was practically one; and Rome had Romanised them in point of language too, to an enormous extent.

Outside Roman ideas of life, public, religious, or economic, there was only an ever-dwindling number of particularities, except the new force of Christianity. There was, inside that Empire, almost uninterrupted peace for generations; and the world seemed to have reached its final and definite equilibrium. To the present day many an historian and student of history contemplates that famous Empire as the be-all and end-all of human felicity; and it is indeed not easy to deny one's admiration

to a polity that enabled so many millions of highly civilised people, together with many half-civilised or still less developed nations, to dwell in relative peace over the vast area stretching from Syria to Yorkshire.

For practical purposes, then, we may very well take the Roman Empire as the classical type of lay Empires proper.

In point of territory the American Empire (barring a few recent and not quite assimilated provinces in the West Indies and in the Pacific) is identical with the Roman Empire. It is absolutely continuous and self-contained. In point of inner uniformity it is even superior to the Roman Empire. The sixty million white Americans, although "recruited" from all the "races" of Europe, are in reality one compact mass of the most uniformly developed citizens the world has ever seen.

However incapable a European may be to judge some features of American life, even after a sojourn of a year or two in the States, he is certainly well qualified to estimate aright the one thing to which his education in Europe has accustomed him every day of his life: we mean diversity of type. Europe, as the Greater Hellas that it is, is full of the most astoundingly varying types of physiognomy, language, manners, customs,

laws, arts, games, amusements, men and women. He must be quite deprived of all intellect who, having been brought up in Europe, has not acquired the sense of noting the bewildering differences in types characteristic of every corner of Europe.

In coming to America, the European is, as all admit, struck by nothing so forcibly as by the monotony of types, whether in language, customs, manners, opinions, or tastes. This uniformity, or homogeneity of the American people is, only in a much higher degree, what students of history have long noticed to have been the case in the Roman Empire.

Already in the first century A.D. we find, both in the inscriptions and in the literary works of the time, a surprising homogeneity of tone and form. Whether the inscription was penned in Gaul or in Mauretania, in Sicily or in Asia Minor, it is ever more nearing a uniform level of shallowness and banality. Whether the writer comes from Spain, as did Seneca, or from Italy, as did Tacitus, there is the same tendency to sententious terseness and artificiality. Whether the jurist was a Phœnician, like Ulpian, or an African, like Africanus, there is practically the same bent of thought and expression. In the second and still more in the third century A.D. this uniformity becomes the level of mediocrity,

and in the fourth century, always excepting the Christian writers on religion, the intellect of the Roman Empire had become stale and unprofitable.

The Americans are, it is true, very indignant at the remarks of Europeans on their uniformity. Apart from the fact that the Americans are indignant at any except the most laudatory remarks on their country, they ought, we venture to submit, to consider that undoubted uniformity from a standpoint much more elevated than national vanity. We say, undoubted; and we hasten to add, that Empires such as the American could not possibly have been built up unless that uniformity was observed more and more strictly.

The American Empire, although on all fours with the Roman *Imperium* in point of territory—*i.e.* configuration in space—is, in point of time, totally different from it. Rome, indeed, was not built in a day; America was. The Roman Empire was reared in a thousand years, from the territory of one town to the immense extent of the *Orbis Romanus* in the third century A.D. The American Empire was built up in two or three generations, after 1783. If, then, the Romans were obliged to pay, amongst other prices (which we shall see later on), the very heavy penalty of ever-growing homogeneity, it stands to reason that the Americans,

trying to do, if under altered circumstances, within seventy to eighty years what it took the Romans a thousand years to do ; it stands to reason, we say, that the Americans were necessarily obliged to pay that penalty of uniformity in a much higher degree still. For there can be no doubt that the higher the ideal, the heavier the penalty we must pay for it.

If ever there should be a time when wars cease ; when Universal Brotherhood reigns supreme in the world ; when wealth will be equally distributed, and intellect quite general,—if ever such a time should come, then we may rest assured that we shall pay for it by the skin of our teeth, with our very souls. For such an extreme ideal, an extreme penalty is sure to be exacted ; and that alone should open the eyes of so many well-meaning Utopians to the realities, and let us be candid, to the true humanities of things. We are not meant to be angels: the price is too big. We cannot afford it.

Or do we not see that when people were driven into the Great Desire ; when they were prompted to raise a vast Empire ; when, in addition to all manner of less noble motives, they were also filled with the imposing hope of peopling up immense spaces of uncultivated land ; of giving comfort

and ease to untold millions of poor people ; of establishing a new realm where goodness and friendliness amongst men are frequently realised and much cherished ;—in other words, when people had the audacity, the Promethean boldness, to aspire to and realise all this magnificent labour and ideal which we call the American Empire ;—do we not see that such grandeur, so rapidly won, so quickly acquired, could be won and acquired only at the expense of severe losses in some of that human capital which constitutes our proud heritage ?

On hearing Europeans criticise or mock at American uniformity, the true American ought to reply with Roman dignity : “ Be it so, friend ; we *are* excessively uniform. But we have in the shortest possible time given uniform happiness to millions of unfortunate Europeans, and uniform cultivation to billions of barren acres of land. Could we have done this while permitting each of us to persist in the intense differentiation of his own individuality ? You admire the Greeks ; so do I. But I follow the Romans.”

We have thus ascertained the second type of Empire—the American type.

If, now, we turn to the third or Russian type, we cannot but see that, while it resembles, in point

of duration of growth, very much more the American Empire—in that it reached most of its extent in less than three hundred years—it is, in point of autocratic institutions, very much more like the Roman. The Tsar is pope and emperor in one person, as was the Roman *princeps*. One will goes through every nerve of this vast organism ; and all attempts to alter this fundamental constitution by the introduction of representative government, or autonomous provinces (in Finland, Poland, or the Caucasus) have necessarily failed. We say, necessarily ; and nothing less can be said.

They are quite blinded, by the rhetorical phrases of the period from 1848 to 1850, who still believe that the Russian people endure the autocrat Tsar because of their lack of enlightenment. Nothing is less true. That millions of Russian peasants are most illiterate and uninformed, there is no doubt whatever. On the other hand, it is not their illiteracy, in the first place, that makes them submit to the Tsar. In Austria the people were already, in the eighteenth century, in a very advanced stage of civilisation, and in the first half of the nineteenth century they could certainly not be called illiterate or unenlightened. Yet they bowed down to the whip of Metternich with the same meekness that appears to us so

revolting in the Russian peasant. The fact is, that the Russians too are, and have long been, seized with the pride and fever of Imperialism.

We tried above to show that they could not but become Imperialists. We now want to call the reader's attention to the inevitable consequence of that great Pride and Fever. Once it seizes you firmly, you will, you must, adapt the rest of your moral economy to the exigencies of that great and noble passion. You cannot stop short of great results, merely because they entail heavy sacrifices. You will belittle and disdain such sacrifices. Have not the Americans willingly accepted the sacrifice of Individuality in order to build up a vast and mighty Empire? So have the Russians. The Americans have endured and are enduring the tyranny of one type after which each of them must model his own self. The Russians have endured and are enduring the tyranny of one Will, of one Autocrat, to whom each of them must conform his own will.

Is there really such a great difference between the two systems? Is there really more than the difference between spheres social and spheres political? The thing is done otherwise in either of the two cases; but is not the same thing done in both? Is it really indifferent to us Europeans

whether we are, or are not, allowed to develop each of us in a somewhat different way? Is Individuality, this the greatest result of Greek and neo-Greek or Renaissance culture, so puny, so contemptible a matter that we can forego it with a smile? Not many Europeans will say so.

The truth is that we Europeans, like our Hellenic ancestors, will rather die than abandon what we hold dearest—our individuality, whether national, religious, artistic, or personal. We are told that some ancient Greek towns, rather than surrender the beautiful statues of gods adorning their temples, preferred to undergo the extreme miseries of a protracted siege. Is any European callous enough to say that there are no such precious ideals enshrined in the hearts of each of the numerous nations and peoples of Europe? Can not all of them say to the levellers : *Nolite adire, nam et heic Dei sunt!* "Do not approach, for here too are gods!"?

Having repeatedly insisted that Imperialism is an inevitable Scheme of National Life, the indulgent reader cannot, we hope, reproach us with clandestinely mocking at the heavy sacrifices imperialist nations are paying for their glory. We ought certainly not to be censured for pointing out clearly that social homogeneity without which the American Empire could not have been built up.

In the same sense of absolute fairness, we add, that to Europeans outside Russia—which is the only real Empire in Europe—such homogeneity is unbearable. Not needing it as the price of a great Empire proper, they are more than loth to endure its shortcomings without its advantages. It was finely said : *Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner* ; but may we not add, that to understand all is also to comprehend why some persons cannot forgive certain things ?

In the Russian, or the third type of Empire, we find therefore a new blend of features—American and Roman. The Russians, no less than the citizens of other Empires, are ready, for Empire's sake, to take upon themselves the burden of political homogeneity, the sacrifice called Tsardom. It is for their Empire, and not from illiteracy or intellectual backwardness, that they submit to an autocracy. Social homogeneity in their vast Empire, which had long before their advent been peopled by thousands of different tribes and nations, was an impossibility.

The Americans themselves peopled up [the States by degrees. The Russians found their new imperial provinces already inhabited by socially most divergent and extremely populous nations. Social levelling-down being thus impossible, the Russians

were inevitably driven into the acceptance of political levelling-down—that is, into autocracy. To weaken the power of the Tsar is to weaken the Empire—that is, to undo what the Russians have these three hundred years been establishing at the fearful price of political self-destruction. Such tremendous revolutions in the whole mental attitude of an immense population can be brought about only by very extraordinary national disasters.

He who thinks that the Russians will, say in 1905, seriously insist upon the Tsar's allowing national government to take the place of the old tyrannical bureaucracy, is grievously mistaken. The Russian people will do nothing of the kind. The present war in the Far East is a real godsend to the Tsar. The secular ambition of the Russians has naturally intensified their imperial pride very much more than their desire for popular government. The stronger passion will prevail. The greater the difficulties in Manchuria and the more obstinate the resistance of the Japanese, the greater and the more obstinate will be the determination of the Russians to save the honour of their Empire. If Port Arthur should fall, the Russians, far from turning their calamity-born energy against the Tsar, will, quite on the contrary, acquiesce in his autocracy with still greater enthusiasm.

So far (December 1904) the Japanese have, in spite of signal advantages in numbers, strategic base, and sea-power, not been able to drive the Russian Army beyond Mukden. It is not likely they will do so in the next six months. But even if they should, that would only render the people of Russia ever so much more obdurate in their belief in autocracy. Should indeed the Japanese arrive on the Volga River, then, and then alone, the Tsar would be obliged to flee for life from his own enraged people. There is a far cry from Mukden to the Volga.

In the preceding remarks on the three types of Empire we have pointed out only a few preliminary features characteristic of each of the three types. In the subsequent section of this part of our pamphlet we shall enter into much more detail regarding other characteristic features. For the present it may suffice to say, that Roman, American, and Russian Imperialism, although they all have features in common, are each of them instinct with forces different from one another.

We ought now to proceed to a short sketch of the fourth type of Empire, the Chinese Empire. From this we must, however, refrain. The author has never lived in China, and is therefore, in his own opinion, not justified in passing a judgment

on a great people and their Imperialism about which he has gathered his data from mere books only. A few incidental remarks on China the author will attempt to make in the course of the following chapters.

The fifth type of Empire is represented by the Roman Catholic Church. Of this it seems more expedient to treat separately in the chapter on "Imperialism and Religion." Incidentally we shall speak also of the Mahometan Empire in the past.

The sixth type of Empire is the British Empire. To the consideration of the peculiar nature of this Empire, the third or last part of this work will be devoted.

Of the temporary Empires of Charles V., or Napoleon, as also of the Spanish Empire, the reader will find, *à propos* of various questions, a short consideration in more than one section of this work.

We now propose to study the influence of Imperialism on women generally, and the women of some of the types of Empire severally.

IMPERIALISM AND WOMAN

THERE seems to be nothing less evident than the plain fact that each nation consists of men and women, and, therefore, that we cannot adequately understand the history of a nation unless we have adequate ideas both of her men and her women. As a rule, historians and statesmen treat women as a subject scarcely worth their serious attention. It is thus but too natural that the precise influence of women on history, or the causes that co-operate in the formation of one or another type of women, are as yet not cleared up at all. There is probably no exaggeration in saying that nineteen readers out of twenty of a pamphlet on Imperialism do not expect a chapter such as the present, at all. What have women to do with Imperialism? What has Imperialism to do with women?

When, however, we do not forget that Imperialism is not merely a series of military and

naval or economic measures of defence; when we firmly grasp that Imperialism is an entire Scheme of National Life,—then we shall be much less inclined to wonder at the question of Imperialism and Women. In fact, women, together with men, are indissolubly connected with Imperialism. When, for instance, we dig deep enough to reach the bottom causes of the failure of Napoleon, we shall find that they all converge on one broad cause: the Frenchwoman.

It is quite correct to say, as the author has done before this, that of single nations the French themselves were the main cause of the downfall of the great Emperor. For had they, in 1814 or 1815, really and resolutely rallied round Napoleon, as in 1792 they did round Dumouriez, even united Europe could not have done more than deprive Napoleon of his German, Italian, or Dutch provinces. Napoleon was beaten at Waterloo; but nothing short of wilful prejudice can blind one to the fact that a general like Napoleon cannot definitively be beaten by one lost battle. Napoleon himself beat the Austrians in more than twelve pitched battles, yet the Emperor of Austria, weak, insignificant Francis, did not consider himself definitively beaten. After Waterloo, on the other hand, Napoleon was definitively beaten because the

French would not support him as they supported Dumouriez in 1792, or Louis XIV. in 1709, after the defeat at Malplaquet.

But when we inquire into the real reason of Napoleon's apparently sudden unpopularity in France in 1814 and 1815, we find that it came almost exclusively from his unpopularity with "Madame." The women of France, even in 1805, at the time of Napoleon's most splendid successes at Ulm and Austerlitz, did not care for his Imperialism. They shrugged their shoulders at the incessant string of new victories over far-off Austria, Russia, or Prussia. With characteristic energy of insight and tact they felt that Imperialism was not the atmosphere in which their peculiar gifts could thrive. They felt that Imperialism, in order to be permanent and powerful, requires women of quite a different type; women less bent on centring all their efforts and charms on the home, on the education and constant supervision of their children, on personal participation in every detail of their husband's business.

In short, Imperialism wants imperial women. Volney, when travelling in French America, in the eighteenth century, was struck with the difference between the French and the English wives of the settlers. The French wife insisted both on having

her "finger in every pie," and on rendering the place where the family had settled so attractive and cosy as to fill her husband with disgust at the very idea of pushing more westward into the "wilderness." Had French women been the wives of Colonials in the thirteen British Colonies, and had they not changed their French characteristics, the Colonials would not have crossed the Alleghany Mountains to the present day. Had Napoleon had American or English women married to his French subjects, ten Waterloos would not have sent him to St. Helena. He would have maintained his former hold over the hearts of men and women in France; and even as his mighty armies could not put down the Spanish in seven years' warring, so the Allies could not have done more than perhaps reduce his power.

There is, indeed, no doubt whatever that Imperialism, as it requires, so it also breeds a peculiar type of women; a type essentially different from the women of mere "countries" or self-contained smaller polities. Who has not made the remark that the women of the *Odyssey* are essentially different from the women of Sophocles and Euripides? In Homeric times the idea of Imperialism was unknown to the Hellenes. There were only small kingdoms. In the times of

Sophocles and Euripides, on the other hand, the Athenians were on the full tide of Imperialism. The Athenian women changed accordingly. We do not hear anything more of Penelopes and Nausikaas. Other types have come to the fore. Is not the hatred of women so characteristic of Euripides a consequence of the imperialisation of the women of Athens?

Women as exacting, as imperious, and interfering as are French women, albeit or just because they clothe all their interminable claims to attention and obedience in forms of singular charm and *esprit*—such women are impossible in imperial countries. Imperialism requires in men such qualities as are likely to be weakened by an undue influence of charming femininity. This is, we take it, the deepest reason that induced Mahomet to allow polygamy to his followers. From the outset he desired to establish a vast Empire. From the outset, therefore, he felt that the undue influence of femininity must be eliminated. Nothing could effect that more fully than the introduction, or rather consecration, of polygamy. A woman knowing that she is only one of four wives of her husband, cannot make good the claims nor the attractions of French women.

We note the same tendency in Napoleon. He

disliked women, and his *Code* is far from favourable to them. In his rather harsh treatment of Madame de Staël there was much more than momentary anger. Madame de Staël was just the full-fledged, genuinely superior *femme* that Napoleon, as an Empire-builder, did not, and could not, humour. In her he hit her type. He could not introduce polygamy; but he effectively tried to lower the importance of women.

It cannot be overlooked that in Empires women necessarily lose much of that femininity which no other mental or physical accomplishment can replace. We hear that in China women suffer an artificial distortion of their feet. This is far from being a mere odd custom. Some disfiguring of the truly feminine must be resorted to in imperial States. The Chinese choose to locate it in the feet of their ladies. This may be queer; it is at the same time quite in keeping with the irresistible tendency of all Imperialism, in reference to women. Yet it goes without saying that this peculiar disenchantment of femininity varies very considerably according to the different types of Imperialism. A rapid sketch of the female element in those different types will show this more clearly.

The Roman matron, from the times when Roman Imperialism had reached its maturity—that is, about

the middle of the second century B.C. to the end of the first century A.D.—was rapidly becoming the notorious unfeminine woman whom all the serious satirists and moralists of Rome have made the subject of their indignation. Historians and poets, philosophers and epigram-writers, all tell us of the heartless wife of the Roman proprætor who proved to be a greater plague to the provinces, than even her rapacious husband. She is constantly about and present at all the assemblies (*convventus*) of the provinces—intriguing, browbeating, mining and sapping everything and everybody.

At Rome she is the same callous creature bent on nothing but to have “a good time.” Festivals, banquets, the circus, the theatre, eastern and strange rites are her passion. She wants to outdo every man in point of athletics, and shrinks from no muscular exercise. She also wants to excel men in mental pursuits; and she has about her some learned Greek with whom she discusses Plato or Epicurus. She is over-mentalised to a degree. Apparently she takes a feverish interest in all the latest products of literature, science, and art. She is a connoisseur, and a great traveller. To be bright, bright, very bright, is her most febrile desire. The obscurity of family life is loathsome to her; maternity she flees, and the fifteenth divorce finds

her as eager to renew the marital tie with some important man as was the case after her first divorce.

Sensation is the dearest wish of her soul. Nothing equals, in her opinion, the delight of creating a sensation ; except creating more sensations than do her rivals. With all that she is beautiful—well-featured, tall, fine in flesh, imposing, and, to the inexperienced, interesting. Of her profound immorality we need not say much. It is but too well known.

This is no doubt a terrible picture. Every student of Roman history knows that it is not overdrawn. It might be said, that the women of whom we hear must not be taken as the type of the numerous Roman matrons who were virtuous and good, but of whom we never hear. Much to the dishonour of humanity, this remark is not true. We can indeed easily "show," that is, compile, a long string of learned quotations from the inscriptions indicating much family virtue, honest family life, and goodness to husbands, children and slaves, even in the second century A.D. Such quotations cut a very proper figure in footnotes meant for the consumption of academic judges. Real force they have none.

It is, alas ! but too true that those undoubtedly

numerous women in the Roman Empire who passed through life correctly and even virtuously would have turned just as wicked or superficial women as were the women described above, had they only had a chance of getting into the *monde où l'on s'amuse*. Their virtue was accidental ; their bent to vice potential. Had the profligate matrons of Rome been a mere local affliction of the Roman Empire, a mere exception, then Rome could never have fallen.

At all times, and in all countries, there have been, and are, women that are no women. But they do not constitute nor express an irresistible tendency in the rest of the nation's women. Had the Roman women really been family-loving, faithful, sound wives and mothers, a hundred new Cornelias would have given birth to a hundred new Gracchi. The rot eating into Rome was, however, contaminating not only a few families, but the Family. It was a cancer affecting, actually or potentially, every one member of Roman womanhood in the Empire.

We need not remind the reader that the influence of Roman Imperialism on Roman women is not altogether the regular influence of any other type of Imperialism on women of any Empire. But we must make bold to say that, as Rome is the classical

type of lay Imperialism, so are her matrons in some ways the actual or potential prototypes of women in any Empire. In Russia, women have long shown but too readable symptoms of Roman matronship. The Russian lady, whether she chooses to undertake the study of law, medicine, or politics, or whether she remains a mere *grande dame*, has always manifested the strongest inclination towards *féminisme* and emancipation of the sex. From the innocuous Bohemian to the female anarchist they all attempt to trample upon the frailties of their sex with ruthless energy. *Piquante* and daring, over-mentalised and self-relying, they plunge into the depths of abstruse metaphysics with the same febrility as into conspiracies and plots.

The more excessive one of the innumerable sects or secret societies in Russia chances to be, the more it is countenanced by the woman of Russia. Family life, conjugal steadiness, love of children, are thrown overboard as mere obsolete prejudices. Already the Polish woman, under the decomposing influence of Polish Imperialism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had long developed the dangerous graces of women free and untrammelled, rendering women averse to the duties of home life. The process of attrition which in the centuries of Polish Imperialism

decomposed the less attractive but more useful features of womanhood in Poland, finally, in the eighteenth century, became positively deleterious. Not the *liberum veto*, but the Polish women hastened the downfall of Poland. There seems to be a tragic revenge in all Imperialism, in that the Empire is in the end politically decomposed by the very persons whom it was the first to decompose ethically.

It is likewise necessary to consider the American woman. In a former work of the author's,¹ a short chapter was devoted to the statement that women in America are deficient in true womanhood as developed in continental, and largely also in English, women. This statement has been received in America with an all but general outcry of indignation. Nothing is more natural. The proper study of womanhood in history or sociology is so young; works with trustworthy information about the women of America are so rare; the gallantry of American men to their women is so great—that any attempt at telling the truth cannot but be condemned by Americans, and also by so many Englishmen who labour under a singularly odd misconception of American womanhood.

The simple fact is that just as the American men were bound to suppress certain features of

¹ *Success among Nations*. 1904.

European manhood in view of the totally different task before them, even so American women were necessarily driven into a constant neglect of certain features of womanhood as developed on the continent of Europe. What Europeans have done in close on three thousand years, the Americans tried to do, in an equally large territory, in the course of a few generations. Evidently the work of the American nation resembles those vast generalisations of facts under which a thousand fine details are bound to get slurred over. A nation that wants to people up and civilise a territory of the size of Europe, in a period of time that did not suffice for the Athenians alone to consummate their history from Solon to Pericles—such a nation cannot possibly hope, nor even seriously desire, to do many things besides.

Both in number and in quality, such a nation must needs select broad and simple issues. They cannot afford to try wholesale, full development of all the human capital, together with the immense imperialisation, of a vast continent. The task is too immense—in fact, it is impossible. The Greeks, who were, as a rule, desperately bent on developing all the human capital; the Greeks, who believed in nothing more fervently than in the cult of complete humanity, of *nature ronde*,—the Greeks could for

this reason alone never seriously think of Empires larger than what is now a moderate principality. Aristotle rightly held that the United Hellenes could have easily defeated the rest of the then world.

But had the Greeks united, they would have ceased to be Greeks ; and in this, the deepest, sense Greeks could never unite. They had to choose between lessening their *beau idéal*, and expanding into an Empire. They elected the former. The Americans, had they tried to do what they actually have done, and also to become like the Greeks ; in other words, had the Americans essayed to be Greeks and Romans at the same time, they would have signally failed, as did the Germans as long as political power was almost exclusively in artistic and intellectually over-strung South and Central Germany. It was only when Prussia got into power, it was only when an artistically and intellectually very much less developed portion of Germany obtained the ascendancy, that Germany found her Bismarck.

Can the most passionately patriotic American refuse to acknowledge this evident historic and human truth ? And if he is unable to deny it, must he not by evident implication admit that human nature has in America necessarily been left fallow in many a field ?

We have already seen that the otherwise natural tendency of men to intense differentiation has, in America, under the pressure of an inevitable, precocious, and extremely rapid Imperialism ceased to work at all ; giving place to an amazing homogeneity and sameness of type. It cannot reasonably be supposed that American womanhood could develop on lines of less amazing sameness. As American men have been bound to pucker up their nature, so to speak, into a few hardworked bundles of nervous energy, otherwise their immense task could never have been done in so short a time ; even so American women were compelled instinctively to drop a goodly portion of that feminine tenderness, *naïveté*, spontaneity, charm, and modesty which were of no use whatever in the one task that their men had set themselves. One does not use string-quartets as fog-signals.

The rude and rugged work of rapidly imperialising a territory of the size of Europe requires women to whom any spot in America will be acceptable ; any change welcome ; any danger a pleasant sensation ; any husband more or less agreeable ; and any publicity unobjectionable. In fact, the more they will resemble their men ethically and intellectually, the more they will help them in reducing every one great problem of life outside *the* great problem of

Imperialism. Women, when highly differentiated from man, excite his imagination, trouble his heart, engage his interest, and generally interfere with his ordinary work very much more, nay, infinitely more, than do women who, like the wives of the imperial Spartans, are, as far as crude Nature will permit it, practically men. Spartan Imperialism was not great territorially. Yet even so it forced the Spartan women into an unseemly unfemininity. They wrestled in a state of nature with men. They did not mean to remain childless, even when married to a man who had no progeny by them.

The extraordinary nature of American Imperialism compelled American women to become more and more like men. Given that all Imperialism must, as we shall see later on, browbeat Nature to a greater or lesser extent, American, that is excessive Imperialism could not but do so in relation to woman too. It unwomaned them. A woman, when only physiologically different from man, ceases to be a subject of deep interest to him. She appeals to his imagination but very little, he to hers none at all. Among Continental peasants true love-affairs are exceedingly rare. Once the great balancing-rod of woman, marital love, has become hollow, she walks over the rope of life's Niagaras as in a dream. She runs up to heights of ambition or

energy with the recklessness of a child ; she tumbles down just as readily. She instinctively feels that her position in the country has wronged her in some of her human aspirations ; and in her frantic attempts to get the even balance of womanhood, she rushes into the most drastic and absurd eccentricities.

In order to browbeat Nature in her most elementary cravings, the American woman becomes a violent temperance-sister ; an anti-tobacconist ; an anti-theatrist ; an anti-Antisabbatarian ; a Christian Scientist ; a Shakespeare-Baconist, or Bacon-Shakespearean ; she attends innumerable lectures ; she learns or tries to learn every science ; she travels constantly ; she is resolved and determined to be up-to-date in everything.

To the earnest student of the human heart the sight of the terrible *corrida* or bull-fight of American womanhood is pitiful in the extreme. Here is the bull of American Imperialism fiercely rushing for the tender limbs of the woman in the States ; she attempts to escape his gorings, and leaps about wretchedly in the most eccentric fashion, all the time pretending to laugh and to enjoy the sport. After a short time she is despatched by the infuriated bull, and other women renew the game of the female toreador. Who has ever seen the incredibly large number of wasted lives amongst the

countless old maids of the States, where men are very much more numerous than women, without feeling something of the sickening pain at the sight of a Spanish bull-fight? Mr. Roosevelt, Imperialist *par excellence*, gravely upbraided the American women for the neglect of their duties of maternity. The gods, on reading Mr. Roosevelt's paper, smiled bitterly. Or does Mr. Roosevelt not see that it is the extravagant Imperialism of the States, so much encouraged by himself, that is the direct cause of that neglect of maternity?

The evils of American womanhood have, singly, all been noticed by American women themselves. The language here used is coldly academic in comparison to that of numerous articles and books written on the question by American women. They know that American women have very little spontaneity. In London drawing-rooms, it is true, a number of English ladies and gentlemen think that American women are indeed spontaneous and natural. How this conclusion is arrived at, it is impossible to divine. Women lose much of their spontaneity under the influence of any Imperialism.

Common experience has shown that any desire to rule others implies the necessity of browbeating Nature. A father, wishing to dominate the education of his child, must inevitably violate his natural

tenderness for the child and punish it severely. A judge does similar things every day of his life; and a thinker anxious to dominate in the realm of ideas must necessarily repress some of the most natural promptings of his being. Imperialism, or the necessity of ruling over vast numbers of people must, *pari passu*, browbeat Nature much more violently. This latent but undeniable correlation between Imperialism and spontaneity was the real cause of the gravest deficiency of Latin literature, its lack of *naïveté*. With perhaps one or two exceptions, there is none of that overpoweringly charming *naïveté* of Greek literature in anything that the Romans ever wrote. Even in English literature proper there is a sad lack of *naïve* figures; in American literature there are none at all.

To remedy this evil, as so many other evils of excessive Imperialism, is possible only by the decomposition of Imperialism itself. American women have tried to remedy their lack of spontaneity and natural charm of female deportment by "schools of education," "lectures on deportment," and similar hopeless nostrums. Sweet womanhood cannot be taught in paragraphs. No wonder the Americans are such great humorists. It would take a superhuman effort to suppress the most scathingly humorous remarks on the constant

attempts in America to stimulate Nature while browbeating it. The wholesale mendacity of this, the main drift of social life in highly imperialised countries, is the true cause that the Spanish, the English, and the Americans alone have given us humorists proper of the first order. Nature, constantly browbeaten, yet constantly rebounds. This gives rise to the most touchingly or drastically humorous situations and scenes ; and American humour, the great redeeming feature of American life, is intimately connected with American Imperialism. Mark Twain, for a European, is only funny ; in America he is, in reality, a great ethical power.

The excesses and evil consequences of American Imperialism on American woman cannot be remedied. It is in vain that many a noble American woman works with ideal energy at the bettering of circumstances that she knows to be bad. She will not make her point. As long as American Imperialism exists, American womanhood will be what it is at present. A hundred thousand more colleges, public libraries, or lecture halls may be established ; a hundred thousand more "societies for the feminisation of women" may be established ; all these will remain without any sensible effect on the peculiar womanhood in America.

The optimism of the Americans, their unbounded confidence in "America" and in everything "American," is strange, if not grotesque; yet in their conviction that everything is for the best in the country of the Great All Right there is much truth. In the present case, for instance, in regard to American women everything *is* "all right," in that it cannot be otherwise. No European critic sees more clearly the self-consciousness, coldness, calculating and scheming callousness of women in America than American women themselves. Hence the abominable spectacle of humorous women in America.

A humorous woman is like a painted man. The same wholesale and profound mendacity of life that has produced so many male humorists in America, has, aided by the greater similarity of American men and women, produced also a number of female humorists in literature and endless would-be female humorists in ordinary life. Woman the prototype of benign, *naïve* Nature herself; woman a humorist! A humorist who, be it remarked, scoffs at Nature, and not at those who violate Nature. Mark Twain, in his better works, uses his humour as a flaying-knife for the simulators of, and trespassers against, Nature. American women delight in indulging in the humour that

makes fun of every ray of natural simplicity, of *naïveté*, of spontaneity ; and the more scathing and vitriolic her humour, the more contentedly will her male relatives and friends chuckle over her "brightness."

At the present time, when Imperialism in the East, in Europe, Africa, and America is apparently carrying everything before it, it becomes indispensable to know at least what prices it exacts. One of the prices of American Imperialism, one of its victims, is the American woman. In that is also the sole consolation for her, and the sole refutation of her adversaries. A European cannot but dislike American womanhood ; but an American woman may rightly reply to him, and with true dignity : "We *are not* womanly ; but we do not mind it seriously. It is through and by our type of lessened femininity that our men were enabled to build up an unparalleled Empire. If we are no Nausikaas, we are Iphigenias. We are immolated to Diana, the fierce unfeminine goddess, in order to secure a fair wind for the sailing army of our men."

We have so far seen that womanhood in Empires of the Roman or sub-Roman type cannot develop to the loveliness of femininity which the world's greatest poets have sung in immortal tones and the strongest of men and heroes have admired and

loved even unto death. The Imperialism of their country stunts their growth ; depletes them ; unhinges and unbalances them ; or, as they express it themselves, renders them "terribly sophisticated." They manifest, it may be admitted, various forms of depletion or poor equilibrium.

The American woman is not quite the Roman *matrona*. The causes of these varieties do not interest us here. For our purpose it is sufficient to state that whenever we study the effects of protracted Imperialism, we find that its fundamental force is the irresistible tendency to browbeat Nature ; and this tendency, by assailing Nature's own prototype, woman, decomposes her, depletes her, unwomans her to a greater or lesser extent. With that decomposition of women there goes a parallel decomposing process in some of men's noblest activities—such as poetry, art, literature in general—on which the unbroken woman has, if indirectly, a profound influence. In other works we have pointed out that the lack of a language entirely and exclusively their own will for ever prevent the Americans, as it has prevented the Belgians or Swiss, from producing a first-rate literature.

In addition to this linguistic or external remark we may state that such an American literature, based as it necessarily would be on women deprived

of most of their naturalness, cannot but become highly artificial and sophisticated. It will in the best case stand to European literature as Latin literature stands to Greek. Music, that is, art in its absolute *naïveté*, is quite impossible in America.

In Russia, where the process of imperialisation has not yet penetrated into the various small nationalities that dwell on Russian territory—in Russia, we say, there is still some music. It has, however, never been, and will be still less in the future, a great music. It is folk-music in Sunday dress. It is formless, structureless, *décousue*. Germs there are plenty; but the ever-rising steam of Imperialism will soon sterilise them. As England had her Shakespeare in her period of transition, after the loss of one Empire and before the acquisition of another; as Germany had her Bach, Mozart, Goethe, Lessing, and Schiller, before Germany was imperialised,—even so Russia has her great musicians before Imperialism has completely penetrated into the masses.

From personal experience during a five years' stay in the United States, the author is fully cognisant with the reply which of course all Americans vouchsafe one after remarks on their poor literature or music. They say, that America is still "so young." They believe that literature,

music, and similar "nice things" are a matter of growth, of time, of "evolution." Moreover, sophisticated and intellectualist as they are, they firmly believe in the teachability of all things. They hope that by getting over to America great teaching musicians, music will be spread in America ; and similarly with science and arts. The truth is that none of the great accomplishments of men can be taught. Liszt had numerous pupils ; but the only man who came near him as a pianist was Rubinstein, whom he never taught. The graces were not made in Vulcan's workshop ; they were the daughters of Vulcan's wife Venus by Apollo.

III

IMPERIALISM AND RELIGION

IMPERIALISM, being a Scheme of National Life, embraces religion as well. In fact, there is little doubt that religion stands to Imperialism in a twofold relation : (i) Religion as imperialism of a specific kind ; (ii) Religion as one of the institutions helpful or antagonistic to Imperialism. Surely the most cursory glance at modern Imperialism is sufficient to establish the fact that Imperialism proper has not succeeded in Roman Catholic countries. Neither the Russians nor the Americans, neither the English nor the Japanese, are, on the whole, Roman Catholic. The Germans, who bid fair to start a new Imperialism, are mostly non-Catholic.

Such a broad fact cannot be a mere accident. If we attempt to get at the vital point of the Roman Catholic Church, we cannot long miss the truth that it was, from the very beginning, meant to be an Empire ; the most universal and powerful

of all the Empires. Without in the least contemplating a discussion of theological problems, we are at a loss to see how any other term can be used. Every one characteristic symptom of Imperialism is manifestly existing in the Roman Catholic Church ; and considering that it is of all the Empires the most comprehensive, in space, as well as in time and intensity of rule, it displays those symptoms and factors not only clearly, but also and pre-eminently in most plastical clearness.

We found that in Empires proper there is, of necessity, a sameness of type, whether social or political, that amounts to a tyrannical pressure upon any desire for individualism. In the Roman Catholic Church that sameness is realised in one of the most intimate and powerful concerns of man, a concern that by its very nature seems almost to preclude all levelling-down and all uniformity : the religious and moral interest. The subjects of the Catholic Empire must abandon the very attempt at forming their own religious and moral ideas. All the innumerable and delicate problems, in which religious and moral sentiments are concerned, must be submitted to the autocratic behest of the Catholic dogma. But religious and moral ideas are only a part of the mental interests that the Catholic Church claims as being exclusively of her

own jurisdiction. All intellectual interests too are categorically declared to be ultimately dependent on the findings of that Church only.

Catholicism expressly teaches that human beings are unable to create truth ; they can only grasp it. All fundamental truth, whether philosophical or otherwise, has been revealed by God to the Catholic Church, and the properly appointed officials of that Church alone can dispense it. Accordingly the entire modern idea of "progress" in knowledge is wrong. Such progress is based on the assumption that some thinkers will in the course, say of the twentieth century, invent, *i.e.* create, new fundamental truths. This is, the Catholic Church teaches us, impossible. All mental and moral truth is already in the possession of the Catholic Church, and believers are, under threat of the gravest penalties, bound to accept the interpretation of truth as given by the Catholic Church.

We have moreover seen that all Empires proper have an irresistible tendency towards browbeating Nature. The Spartans, in their resolute attempt to imperialise, first the Peloponnesus, then all Greece, introduced a constitution that literally trampled upon the most natural human feelings in an absolutely ruthless manner. The child was not allowed to belong to its mother ; nor the wife to her husband ;

nor the slave to his owner. Expression of pain was despised, and boys were systematically trained to suppress it. Conversation was practically forbidden, and the accumulation of wealth prohibited.

We have seen above that in America Nature is at a discount, as it was in the Roman Empire. In the case of the Catholic Church the de-humanisation of men and women was carried out in the most uncompromising and systematic manner. By "men and women" are meant, of course, the persons forming the members of the Church proper ; that is, regular and secular clerics and nuns. To begin with the women. The Church, already, by the mouth of St. Paul, declared : "*Let your women keep silence in the churches ; for it is not permitted unto them to speak.*" This, interpreted in the light of the preceding remarks on the position of women in Empires proper, means that women have no great say in Empires ; that they, *quæ women*, must keep quite in the background, or wreck their true womanhood.

The entire preceding chapter on Imperialism and Women is in these words of St. Paul (1 Cor. xiv. 33) if we only read "Women are silent in Empires proper," which is, in modern terms, the true sense of the much-maligned and misunderstood passage. The Catholic Church, built on the true

principles of Imperialism, did not permit women to be accepted as priestesses or clerics, as had done so many other religious systems built on a psychologically less profound basis. The woman might become a nun—that is, an unwomaned woman ; but nothing else.

With regard to man the Catholic Church pushed the process of dehumanisation to its extreme limit. A regular, or monk, was at all times compelled to abstain, in the most solemn and binding form, from the four principal desires that Nature has implanted in us : (i) the desire of marrying and founding a family ; (ii) the desire of acquiring one's own property ; (iii) the desire of being one's own master ; and (iv) the desire of moving about freely in the world. Monks were forced to remain in absolute celibacy and chastity ; to vow perpetual poverty ; to submit their own will to that of the Superior ; and to be riveted to their monastery (*stabilitas loci*).

When Pope Gregory VII., in 1074 and the following years, categorically confirmed previous church laws to the effect that henceforth neither monks or "regulars," nor priests or "seculars" should be allowed to have any sort of marital relation whatsoever with women, the bishops and minor priests of all Catholic Europe rose in

indescribable uproar against the "mad pope," who, they said, "wanted to tread on Nature's most manifest command." Neither in the letters, nor in the bulls of Pope Gregory VII. do we find his direct and open answer to these violent and "natural" objections of his enraged bishops.

But we may take it for granted that when he met his trusted friend Mathildis, the Countess of Tuscany, in his council-room, he said to her: "Otto, Bishop of Constance, and his followers in the Teutonic realm and elsewhere, accuse me of trampling upon Nature. Precisely. This is just the very thing that the Holy Ghost urges me to do. How shall we conquer the realm of Grace without abandoning the realm of Nature? Could I have won your powerful friendship, my fair friend, without disregarding every other possible tie between us? The reproach of my rebellious bishops is my greatest glory."

The Catholic Church, grafted on the deepest political psychology of the Greeks, and the most mature political traditions and instincts of the Romans, fully realised the clear principle of all absolute Imperialism—to wit, that imperial power can be won only at the expense of the human capital. This, and this alone, accounts to a modern mind for the incredible influence of a

man like St. Bernard, in the first half of the twelfth century.

The Abbot of Clairvaux was neither the legal head of the Cistercians, nor a cardinal; neither a deep scholastic, nor a great scholar; he was neither charitable nor tolerant; neither a military leader, nor a great statesman. Yet he was the dominating figure of his time. For in him, and in his personal asceticism, or well-nigh complete dehumanisation, coupled with his fine oratory, the people of the twelfth century necessarily beheld the great Empire-builder of their time. It was through personalities exhibiting an ideal of dehumanisation that the great Empire of the Church could be and was established.

In that lay the power of the new orders. A St. Bruno, the founder of the severely ascetic Carthusians, although he completely withdrew from the world to the wilderness of the French Alps, and although he ceded to Pope Urban II.'s invitation to Rome only after anxious prayers for relief—St. Bruno was nevertheless one of the principal master-builders of Catholic Imperialism. So were St. Norbert; St. Francis of Assisi; St. Dominic; St. Ignatius de Loyola. They are historically, if in a different manner, of the type of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, or Themistocles. Did not even

Solon browbeat Nature by forcing his fellow-citizens to nullify the debts of their debtors ?

The Catholic method of meeting the needs of the Church in periods of great danger, such as the Reformation, by the foundation of new orders of monks—that is, by intensifying the process of dehumanisation and multiplying its devotees—this process is quite in keeping with the true policy of Imperialisation. Ascetic orders of monks, far from ceasing to arise or to spread in the near future, will, on the contrary, be more numerous than ever. This irresistible tendency to browbeat Nature is so intimate an organ of any Imperialism, that in Empires such as the British or American, where the Catholic mode of dehumanisation is not practicable, other and equally drastic methods of trampling upon Nature have long been introduced.

To these belong the exaggerated value attached to temperance and total abstinence from drinks of any kind. The less it can be proved, either from a study of drinking nations, or from physiological experiments on individuals, that wine, beer, or spirits are not wholesome, the more teetotalism will spread in the English-speaking Empires. It is, in *ultima analysi*, not a question of national hygiene ; but of that inevitable desire for curtailing the human capital, whether of physical or mental vigour,

which must grow up in Empires in proportion to their nearer or more remote similarity to the classical type of all lay Empires—the Roman Empire. In the Roman Empire that tendency to do away with Nature became rapidly so strong, that it succeeded in establishing, already in the fourth century A.D., the Empire of Grace upon the ruins of the Empire of Man or Nature.

To argue with total abstainers is both stupid and a sign of ignorance. Stupid, because their cause cannot, in Empires, be baffled unless some other process of dehumanisation is introduced in the place of theirs ; ignorant, because in arguing with abstainers "on principle," one evidently misses the real point of the question. The reply to abstainers is a vigorous campaign against tea-drinking ; or smoking ; or music ; or dancing ; or "at homes." Some method for trampling on the natural desires of men and women must, in Empires, be found. The abstainers have found one. To defeat their nostrum, some other nostrum for browbeating Nature must be introduced. Nothing is more cogent, more conclusive.

The Roman Catholic Church, then, represents the most consummate form of Imperialism, based on the fundamental principle of all Imperialism, to the effect that we must first remove several of

the strongest natural desires of men, like so many interfering roots, shrubs, or rocks, before the fine cathedral of an Empire can be constructed. In saying this, not the shadow of indignation or a sneer is in the writer's mind. It is intended neither to praise, nor to blame ; but to state facts. The reader is again asked to consider that in the author's conviction Empires are as inevitable under certain circumstances as are city-states. The latter have repeatedly in history shown their signal capacity for raising nearly every one element of humanity to a very high degree of perfection. To Athens, Syracuse, Florence, Venice or Genoa, mankind is under a profound obligation.

On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that all the five city-states mentioned were incipient or small Empires ; and that their beatific influence was restricted only to a few people. In Empires proper the work of humanity is done less intensely, but it reaches incomparably larger masses. Is it not true that the vast majority of people find moral comfort much more easily when members of a big group, than when left to their own petty circles ? There is greater joyfulness in towns than in remote villages ; there is more feeling of life and safety in a nation than in a clan. Individuals endowed with delicate tastes, and careful only to cultivate a

few select friends, are the exception. It is thus impossible to deny the work of "salvation" done by vast institutions such as the Catholic Church; more especially in the early Middle Ages. Nor is it here denied.

In his *General History*, now in the press, the author has repeatedly pointed out the incomparably beneficial work done by the Roman Catholic Empire. What we must insist upon here is the undeniable fact that these benefactions were obtained at the price of the wholesale dehumanisation of hundreds of thousands of clerics. This is only what might be expected. To do the immense work of the Roman Catholic Church implies, psychologically, a series of equally immense sacrifices. It is well known that the priests of the Catholic Church at all times yearned for, nay, courted, martyrdom. Very properly. They deeply felt that since their aims were vast, their sacrifices too must be extraordinary. The lay student, on the other hand, cannot, in common fairness, accept the historic benefactions of the Roman Church and yet sneer at the sacrifices made by her members.

We have so far tried to see what shape religion is taking when it aspires to a Universal Empire. This was the first of the relations of religion to Imperialism. We shall now attempt to show the

influence of religion as an institution favourable or antagonistic to Imperialism.

There is, in the introduction to all physics, a "law," or rather a common-sense statement, to the effect that two bodies cannot coexist in the same place at the same time. The same "law" applies to Imperialism. Two Empires cannot coexist in the same country at the same time. This is the key to many a momentous fact of history. It is evident, to begin with, that such peoples as were "driven" into Empire-building on a grand scale could not look upon the Roman Catholic Church with a favourable eye. This Church, being an Empire, absorbs some of the best forces of a country for its own use. It moreover cannot be sincerely favourable to vigorous initiative on the part of the people. Being established to rule, to command, any popular tendency to the contrary is antagonistic to it.

In France, for instance, the great power of the Catholic Church has at all times prevented the rise of two great lay parties in politics, and thus of representative government proper. The Catholic Church where it is powerful invariably attracts so much interest, and assimilates so many partisans, that all political lines of cleavage are determined by ecclesiastic or anti-ecclesiastic issues. Lay parties

proper cannot form, and parliamentary government is impossible. Moreover, imperial instincts are more directly and more magnificently gratified by the old historic dignities of the universal Catholic Church, and so are deflected from channels of lay Imperialism. Wherever therefore a nation was placed in a position of attempting, as a national necessity, the great work of Empire-building, the people could not but be instinctively antagonistic to the Catholic Church.

So it was in England in the sixteenth century ; in the Byzantine Empire at all times ; in the United States ; in the Dutch Empire ; in Russia ; and the apparent exception of Spain is fully explained by the circumstances leading to the establishment of the Spanish Empire. This famous Empire was established, almost exclusively, not by necessity, but by marriages and by easy victories over feeble natives. The renowned marriages by which the Netherlands, the Franche-Comté, the Milanese, the Germanic Empire, and most of modern Austria-Hungary fell, directly or indirectly, into the hands of the Spanish Hapsburgs implied, by necessity, an acceptance of the Catholic Church, in that they were all made previous to the Reformation. The easy conquests over Mexicans, Peruvians, and other American natives, brought

vast territories under Spanish rule with such astounding rapidity (from 1519 to 1540) that the Spanish, for reasons already mentioned above, could not possibly deem it practicable to miss those unprecedented opportunities by involving themselves at the same time in great conflicts with the Catholic Church. On the other hand, the Portuguese Empire under Pombal at once commenced a series of measures hostile to the Catholic Church; and Portugal was the first Catholic country to expel the Jesuits (1759).

The historic relation of the English to Catholicism, which is of more immediate interest to us, is very plain. When the English in the sixteenth century became more and more conscious of the fact that from their situation in the due centre of the then world they ought also to have a large share of those imperial provinces which, for different motives, above indicated, they needed for the fortification of their defence at home, they keenly felt that the great antagonist to all their national desires was the Catholic Church. The greatest political and military power was then in the hands of the ultra-Catholic King of Spain; and all the home disturbances in England were caused by conflicts with the Catholic Church, then in the full swing of the all but victorious Counter-Reformation.

Under these circumstances it can astound no one that Catholicism appeared to most high-minded English patriots the thing most hostile to all the great interests of England, and therefore most hateful. In other words, the nascent second Imperialism of England rebutted with all its might its latent enemy, Catholicism. The terrible outcry against "Popery" was pre-eminently a political, an imperialist, watchword. The religious question was quite secondary ; nor has it given rise to a single great literary onslaught on Catholicism in any way comparable to similar attacks in eighteenth-century or nineteenth-century France. The English, long trained in Imperialism, clearly felt that they would never be able to build up the Empire they so much needed, if Catholicism retained a firm hold on the country.

The example of France has fully borne out this view. France has vast colonies ; but no Empire. There is no imperialist sentiment, sense, or vocation in the French people. They have allowed themselves to remain too "natural" ; too much inclined to the Hellenic type of full-blooded humanity ; too much intent on keeping their women as well-balanced as are their mature men : in short, the French have never been able to undergo or to submit to the sacrifices entailed by Imperialism.

The reason for this is, to some extent, in the fact that such sacrifices were vicariously made by such Frenchmen as became members of the Catholic Church ; the latter maintaining her intimate influence on the French people through all the ages.

In England, on the other hand, the sacrifices of human capital were, by the rising Puritans, gladly undertaken. Puritanism is to the English what the *Regula*, or the Statutes of the monastic orders were to the monks. The British Sunday is to other days of the week what Imperialism is to Parochialism. No legislation can ever do away with it. It is part of that voluntary self-mortification which, as we have seen, is an integral factor in any high-strung Imperialism. Having no monastic orders proper, the British naturally and voluntarily cloister themselves at least one day of the week. The British Sunday ; Total Abstinence ; Mrs. Grundy ; and several other social features are all part and parcel of that sacrifice of some of the light and beauty of life so indispensable in all Empires.

Puritanism was not a temporary, accidental movement arising about 1567-70 as an imitation of Dutch Calvinism, which was then in full revolt from Philip II. Nor was it merely a religious movement arising from theological dissent only. It was imperialist from the beginning ; it was the

mould and cast of the rising Imperialism of the British, as the Essenes and the Therapeutes were the mould of the Christian Empire; and as we see in the case of the Romans, who, unconsciously imperialist in tendency from the very start, observed an ethical rigour that even the staunchest of English Puritans would have found too exacting.

At the present time we note in Russia a Puritan teacher of extraordinary force, if apparently also of unusual absurdity. Tolstoi abhors Russian Imperialism; he is really its first great product and its chief abettor. No Imperialism can do without its Puritanic element; and as Dutch and English Puritanism was helped on by Calvin and Knox, so Russian Imperialism is now being taken in hand by Tolstoi. The latter will deny and does deny that he has anything to do with Imperialism. So did Calvin and Knox. In the *Institutio Christianæ Religionis* of Calvin there is not a word of Imperialism; it has nevertheless been the modern textbook thereof. Athens, but faintly imperialist, saw Puritanism at a late stage, and only in the form of harmless Cynics. The Cynics who cast a gloom over England in the first half of the seventeenth century were prompted by the most powerful, because secular and indispensable, instinct of the English—by Imperialism.

To the present day the cheerlessness of life in England, which no serious observer can deny, is part and parcel of the rigour, Roman gravity, and unemotionality inherent in the instincts that feed the love and power of Imperialism. The systematic gloom of cloisters and monasteries of the Catholic Empire corresponds directly to the unsystematic yet equally necessary want of grace and charm in most English middle-class families. In both cases the forces and power of Imperialism are bought at the expense of human brightness.

Should the English lose their Empire to-morrow, they would within one generation become precisely like the French. And *vice versa*: the French, clinging more heartily to their national brightness and cheerfulness than to ideals of great power, undid their greatest chance for Imperialism under Napoleon, and at present take their colonies very indifferently. Nor will the Italians ever become Imperialists; and the Spanish only when they will all turn Protestants.

If now we carefully think out the relations—so universally ignored—between Imperialism and Religion, we shall easily see that the English, ever and necessarily desirous for an Empire, could not accept Catholicism as their religion. According to the unalterable organisation of the Catholic Church,

a Catholic Archbishop of Canterbury would, in a Catholic British Empire, become the most powerful person of all. Combined with the King, no parliament could resist him. Combined with parliament, he might render the King a mere figure-head.

Already during the first great period of English Imperialism under the later Plantagenets, there was in England a very marked tendency to cut loose from Rome. Had Crécy and Poitiers led to permanent results, Wyclif would have died the leader of probably the majority of Englishmen. What Wyclif failed to do, owing to the ephemeral results of English Imperialism in his time, the Puritans of the seventeenth century succeeded in establishing once for all. By resolutely breaking the power of Catholicism they paved the way for an Imperialism that did not require the sacrifice of all political liberty too.

In the same way it became quite evident to the dullest mind in England that unless the irresistible tendency to Imperialism was accompanied by a similarly strong moderation of the King's prerogative, Imperialism would naturally play into the hands of the Crown. What an uncontrolled King of England could allow himself to exact, the people had learned under the Tudors. What

an uncontrolled English Emperor of a vast Empire might indulge in, the popular mind shuddered to think. Puritanism was thus the main lever of British Imperialism ; as monasticism and priesthood are the main force of the Catholic Church.

It is thus quite clear that the feebler forms of Protestantism, such as Lutheranism, have come to prevail in non-imperial countries ; while Holland, England, and America have always shown a strong leaning to the more Puritanic forms of Nonconformism. The Anglican Church, a compromise between Rome and Geneva, is by itself neither imperialist nor anti-imperialist ; it has thus, on the whole, played an indifferent rôle in the history of British Imperialism. In France, on the other hand, the Catholic Church is necessarily more imperialist than the French nation ; and should the French one day quite abandon or lose their colonies, the French people will manifest a very strong tendency towards complete secularisation of their social life. Renan and his school have, in point of historic truth, done very little with regard to the early history of Christianity ; and his *Life of Jesus* is quite worthless, because fundamentally vitiated by an unhistoric conception of Jesus. However, as one of the great attacks on the Catholic Church, Renan's work is very important.

But as long as the still outstanding question between France and Germany is not settled to the satisfaction of France, the Catholic Church in that country is not seriously endangered. For the Freemasons, Comtists, and other sectarians of mere *lumière*-worship—in short, *les intellectuels*—in France will, owing to their studied unaggressiveness and love of peace, never be able to repair the tarnished honour of France ; and accordingly the Catholic Church, countenancing, as she does, war, will continue to have a powerful hold on the French people. Mere rationalism, as may be seen, cannot possibly secure a firm hold on either the Americans or the English ; because both nations are, the former excessively, the latter strongly, imperialist. They need more than anything else an over-rigorous code of moral views, whatever their actions may be. They stand in absolute need of sombre and gloomy, not to say superstitious and intolerant, ethics and religious beliefs ; and will be inclined to part with them only after the dissolution of their Imperialism. The French, on the other hand, may very well arrive at a purely “rational” religion, especially if they content themselves, as in the last thirty years they have, with a share of merely academic influence on international affairs.

The intimate connection between Imperialism

and Religion helps us even in the comprehension of the strange phenomenon of the Jews. The orthodox among them form, all the world over, a sort of union that is not without a tinge of imperialist elements. For this reason alone they are bound to keep up their sombre and forbidding attitude to the rest of mankind. In the States, where the Jews have largely relaxed in their ritual rigour, they have alone of all Jews, deliberately withdrawn from most non-Jewish social circles.

Christianity, precipitated into existence by the classical type of lay Empires, by the Roman Empire, without which it could scarcely have spread in Europe—Christianity rapidly took up the organisation and powers of a vast spiritual Empire. When, since the sixteenth century, new lay Empires became possible, both west and east of Europe, the Catholic Empire necessarily came into lasting conflict with nations, such as the Dutch, English, and Russian, that were determined to build up Empires of their own.

This conflict is going on to the present day. Its issue is unknown. It is certain that, as long as either English, American, Russian, German, or Japanese Imperialism retains its powerful vitality, the Catholic Church stands but a poor chance of regaining lost territory. The Japanese, for

instance, cannot possibly become Catholics. They are naturally antagonistic to all European powers, and thus cannot submit to a European pope. Since Mahometanism, which attributes pontifical powers to the Emperor (Khalif), is likewise impossible in Japan, the Japanese can never sincerely wish to become Mahometans. For similar reasons Christianity has no substantial hopes in any part of Asia, outside the Russian dominion. The reader may judge for himself what *religious* value may be attached to the immense labour and expense of missionary work in Asia. In Africa, on the other hand, missionary work may still be carried on with some hopefulness.

IV

IMPERIALISM AND INTELLECT

THE amount and value of intellectual work done, whether in Literature, Philosophy, History, Science, or Art, in periods of strong Imperialism, are as a rule rather poor. Excessive Imperialism, such as that of the Romans, the Catholic Church, or the Americans, has an irresistible tendency to render the intellect poor in resource, blunted in imagination, dry and stale in point of ideation. The literature of the Romans is, on the whole, artificial, cold, unimaginative, and poor. Such Latin classics as do really appeal to us—for instance, much of Catullus and Lucretius—were written at a time when Roman Imperialism was not yet definitely established, nor the only mental attitude of people.

Catholic literature—that is, works written by monks or priests—apart from its purely theological interest, has rarely risen to anything like the level of great secular writers. No monk or priest of the

Middle Ages approaches Dante. The Benedictines and the Jesuits have to the present day shown a prodigious literary activity. Their output of works, learned, philosophical, and technical, is nothing short of vast. Yet not one of them has contributed a "classic" to the literature of any nation. At best, they produce erudite books of reference.

The same phenomenon may be observed with regard to the Americans. Their excessive Imperialism, having long impaired their emotional life, has thereby so seriously reduced their powers of ideation and original thought, that of all the nations actively engaged in pursuit of literature, philosophy, and science, the Americans have contributed the smallest number of leading ideas or literary gems.

This grave deficiency is of course again referred, by Americans, to the "youthfulness" of the States. Yet might not their great War of Independence, or their immense work of civilising a continent of the size of Europe in the course of a few generations, have inspired a few of their innumerable writers to a work of imposing grandeur? The fact is that American Imperialism desiccated American hearts, and *les grandes pensées viennent du cœur*. The idolatry devoted in America to intellect—as if such a thing existed by itself, as if the intellect was anything else than the valet of our emotions ; the fanatic

devotion to excessive reading of books and journals ; to an over-estimation of the value of teaching ; to a constant search after digests, *résumés*, abstracts, condensations, and all other kinds of intellectual bovrils : all this, together with the countless libraries, universities, and higher colleges in America—what has it resulted in ? Has America given us Darwinism ? Has she reformed the historical sciences ? Has she given us a new philosophical clue ? Has she broken new ground in any of the great sciences ?

The Americans have published useful indexes to European works. They are pre-eminently collectors, sifters, a nation of elder Plinys. They stand in point of intellect to Europe as did the Byzantines to ancient Greece ; and for the same reason. The Byzantines too were excessively imperialised, hence uncreative. Undoubtedly, the Americans have made several very startling and important inventions. It must, however, never be overlooked that inventions stand to real scientific work as do mere happy improvisations to real musical compositions. Inventions are mostly matters of haphazard. They are like lightning-flashes to the abiding light of the sun.

Art, for which man, according to the profound remark of Goethe, is much more gifted by Nature than he is for Science ; Art, man's proper sphere

and glory—the sphere where he is quite “at home,” quite himself, quite human; Art proper is impossible in countries of excessive Imperialism. Art requires unbroken men: full-blooded, full-fledged, Hellenic, or neo-Hellenic humanity. Such humanity, as we have seen, cannot prosper in the sirocco of excessive Imperialism; nor can Art. There may be apparent exceptions, but when they are looked into carefully they are invariably found to confirm the great principle that there never have been exceptions to the working of any one great and puissant national influence such as Imperialism.

The resources of Imitation are great; and much may be done that looks like Art. What can never be imitated, what is *par excellence* a matter of unique creativeness, that is real Art. The Romans had some fine features in their Art; but they had no Parthenon. What made the Parthenon were the tragic sufferings, the jubilant triumphs, the intense despair, and the equally intense intellectuality of the Athenians. It takes heaven and hell to build up a Parthenon. The Romans—whose emotionality was just as blunt as was their intellect—the Romans knew of Order and Duty; but they never descended into Hades, nor did they ever rise to the Elysian spheres.

As mere historical facts about which there can be

no further discussion, it is evident that, with the apparent exception of Spain, all the other countries in Europe have had their intellectual heyday before they were imperialised to any considerable extent. Take England. Shakespeare and Newton are generally held to be England's greatest intellectual glories. In Shakespeare's time, England did not possess a single village in France or on the Continent ; Scotland was quite separated from England ; and Ireland was being appropriated through long and but too painful struggles. In Shakespeare's time England had no Empire at all, the American settlements being mostly in a half-private status. In Newton's time, English Imperialism began indeed to assert itself ; but very slowly and, for the greater part of Newton's life, very dimly.

In Germany, the rise of her greatest poets, thinkers, men of science, and musicians synchronises with her total absence of any real Imperialism ; in fact, with her political atomisation into hundreds of petty sovereignties. None of these German glories were born after 1850 ; and most of them before 1800, or still more precisely, from 1724 to 1770. The same phenomenon is evident in Italy, whose immortals all date from the time of small city-states, or duchies. To France it is impossible

to apply our principle, in that France, except half-heartedly under Napoleon for a few years, has never been sincerely imperialist. In Spain indeed we note that the strong Imperialism of the times of the three Philips (Philip II., Philip III., and Philip IV.) did not materially interfere with the Spanish intellect, and some of the glories of Spanish literature and art lived and worked in the times of the three Philips.

It will, however, be noted that the Spanish intellect was deprived of its emotional basis to a far smaller extent than was the case with other Empires. For reasons already adduced, the Spanish people could not launch on their career of Imperialism without taking upon themselves a profound religious enthusiasm for a highly artistic Church. While their excessive orthodoxy at once deprived them of great scientific or philosophical thinkers, it helped considerably the rise of great religious dramas and of sacred painting. Calderon and Sta. Theresa were inspired by pretty much the same holy feeling of deep religiousness. Cervantes, on the other hand, is quite in keeping with Imperialism, in that his immortal novel is born out of an exquisite sense of the wholesale mendacity so rampant in energetic Imperialism. That mendacity is the parent of true humour; and it is as a

masterpiece of humour, in the great sense of the term, that Don Quixote is admired and loved by the whole world. Or is not Don Quixote Spain herself? Spain with her apparent power and wealth, and her real weakness and poverty. But in spite of these exceptionally favourable circumstances, the Spanish intellect soon became decadent, and from the reign of Charles II. onward lost all force and importance for nearly two centuries.

Intellect too, we may sum up, is at a discount in excessive Imperialism. Nothing can be more impressive than the absolute barrenness of the human intellect in the Roman Empire, after the first century A.D. Surely one might have expected to see some great inventions made; some extensive work of colonisation and civilisation carried out east of the Rhine and Maine Rivers; some great discoveries of continents realised: in short, we might expect the work actually done some fourteen centuries later.

Greek literature, poor fragments of which were sufficient to kindle the glorious flame of the Renaissance in the fifteenth century, the Roman Imperialists had in its entirety. Why did it not kindle a Renaissance in the third century A.D.? For the same reason that all the literature and art of modern Europe is unable to kindle a true Renaissance in

the States. The Romans too had vast libraries, and many a learned man ; but their excessive Imperialism had long desiccated their minds. They were unable to assimilate creatively what the Greeks had bestowed upon them. Even in the one great science in which the Romans have left us an imperishable intellectual heritage, in their Private Law, already the first quarter of the third century saw the last great Roman jurists.

Nor can it be admitted for a moment that that great science was initiated in the times of the Roman Empire. The *veteres*, as the Romans called their great jurists of the time previous to the Emperors, had long established the system, principles, and method of Roman law. The Empire did not produce a jurist greater than Marcus Antistius Labeo. It is self-evident that the Carthaginians, through their excessive Imperialism, completely dried up the wells of poetic or philosophic inspiration ; and even their Hannibal, the greatest military genius of post-Greek antiquity, was not celebrated by them in any literary or artistic shape worthy of him. The Italians are indeed the creators of many of Europe's most precious intellectual treasures ; but it is not in strongly imperial Venice that we must look for Italian intellect at its best. Venice had her Aldi, her Fra Paolo Sarpi ;

but no Poliziano, no Machiavelli, no Lionardo, no Michael Angelo.

Already in modern, largely imperialised Germany the tendency to sterile erudition is but too evident. In Berlin University there are mostly men who excel in massiveness of learning much more than in the power of intellectual grasp over facts. In oriental history Winckler; in economics A. Wagner; in history the late Theodor Mommsen; in law Otto Gierke, etc. etc., have published books so numerous and so overladen with quotations that one may with regard to them say what in his time was said of Onuphrius Panvinus: "Onuphrius has read so much that one wonders how ever he found the time to write a line; and he has written so much that one fails to understand how he found the time of reading so many books not written by himself." The rate at which a scholar may hope to write himself into a chair at Berlin is, at least, ten thousand pages closely packed with innumerable quotations from all the books from Pharaoh Pta-hotep downwards.

With rising Imperialism in Germany this Cyclopæan massiveness will be on the increase, and one must not despair of seeing a history of Katzenellenbogen in twenty quarto volumes comprising only the introduction and general plan

of a work filling such a painful gap in German history. The German Universities turn out scholars who have ready "frames" and "classifications" for any subject; so that they will (the writer vouchsafes the truth of the fact) finish in a given time a history of the French Revolution, or the *History and Constitution of the English Church*, with all the necessary ribbons and garlands of erudite quotations, without having really the faintest hold on their subject. This is how the Chinese have long become, through their excessive Imperialism, the compilers of a huge encyclopædia in several thousands of volumes, whereas the most extensive European encyclopædias do not now go beyond thirty to forty volumes.

It is in vain that people saddled with an excessive Imperialism attempt with frantic efforts to stimulate and systematise themselves into a more creative intellectuality. In the result they become only more eccentric and grotesque, but do not increase their power of original thought. This is one of the heavy prices they pay for their imperial glory. We cannot have it both ways, as a barrister once remarked drily, but very truly. A nation must be conscious, very clearly conscious, of its mental possibilities, just as of its military resources. We despise people that brag of their martial greatness

on the strength of a small army ; we cannot admire nations that indulge in infantile conceit regarding their mental equipments.

The hard and incontrovertible fact is this, that many a small nation of the world has excelled and always will excel the imperialist realms in point of intellectual elasticity and vigour, and is thus able to maintain itself, if aided by some geo-political or military advantage of its country, even against a very powerful Empire. The world is evidently divided, as it has always been in historic times, between a few very large Empires and a number of small polities. But he commits a profound error who assumes that the world will, in the end, be imperialised altogether—that is, shared out between two or three great imperial nations, Anglo-Saxon, Yellow, or Slav. Nothing of the kind will ever take place. The imperialist nations will always be at a considerable disadvantage in point of intellectual force, and thus unable to overcome the ever new obstacles rolled in their progress of conquest by some small but intensely organised nations.

So it was when the Assyrians and Egyptians were checkmated and shorn of sea-power by the small Phœnicians ; so also when the Persians were driven back by a few Hellenes ; and at present

we see the Russian Empire thwarted by little Japan. Lord Salisbury's dictum that there are nations successful and nations decadent, with its evident hint that the successful nations are Imperialists, is hopelessly wrong. Even Spain will now regain that intellectual vigour and progressiveness which her Imperialism caused her to neglect, and then we shall soon see Spain play a very important rôle in South Europe. Some of the "small" nations in Europe, such as Hungary (18,000,000 inhabitants) stand chances of success fully as great as, if not greater than, those of some big Empires. The world will not be partitioned out by two or three nations, because man's greatest force, his intellect—that is, his powers emotional and mental—will always be more intense, more powerful, with smaller nations than in Empires.

What after all destroyed the Roman Empire? Its inevitable intellectual dearth. And who availed themselves of this fatal deficiency and established, on the ruins of the Roman Empire, the Catholic Empire? A few Jews and Greeks. Emperor Trajan, in his answer to the report on the early Christians sent by the younger Pliny, treated the whole affair as one of no importance. He little suspected that the Roman Empire, then at its height, and apparently based on the most solid

foundations of power, order, law, and civil liberty, was soon to be overpowered by the very petty sect that both he and Pliny held in such poor respect.

Intellect—by which we mean not only the power of correct judgment and the power of creating ideas, but also and pre-eminently the power of artistic thought—such intellect, which presupposes a rich emotional basis, cannot, in the long run, thrive in Empires. And the quicker Imperialism develops, and the more absolute and excessive it becomes, the less its intellect will be able to hold its own. Apollo dwells in small Delphi, not in Babylon. This truth would have long been recognised as one of the elementary propositions in history and politics, if these studies were not almost completely disorganised by false or half-true notions such as “Race,” “National Character,” and other latent or open premisses arising simply from the vanity of people.

Not one Englishman in a thousand will hesitate to ascribe the political backwardness of the small Balkan nations to their “weak national character.” As a matter of fact the Balkan nations are completely paralysed by the Great Powers, who would never endure a federation of the Greeks, Servians, Roumanians, and Bulgarians, but combat

it by land and on sea. No nation in Europe could under these circumstances do more than is achieved by the Balkan nations. This is the reason why we said above that small nations must be aided by some geo-political circumstances, otherwise their intellect avails them but little.

From whatever point we approach the problem of the correlation between Imperialism and Intellect, we always arrive at a corroboration of the great truth that the intellect requires a very rich soil of emotional forces. In Empires the emotions being left to cool off in early youth, and being systematically held in severe check, the intellect is deprived of its richest affluents, and so tends to become dry, formal, lacking in power of *à propos*. The lack of spontaneous, quick intellect, of what the French call *esprit prime-sautier*, is also a further cause why in Empires of the extreme type there is such extraordinary value attached to the most elaborate systems of education.

No nation does as much for education as do the Americans. They cannot afford, as do the French, to leave the better part of education to the spontaneous forces of social intercourse. There are no such forces in America. In France no individual can long indulge in any of those eccentricities of behaviour or speech which are so

frequently met with in England or America. Such an individual would quickly meet with the sharpest rebuke in the shape of scathing repartees on the part of any Frenchman or Frenchwoman. In France each man educates every other man or woman ; and *vice versa*. There being no castes, and there being a rich well of intellectual spontaneity, every sort of crudeness, rudeness, or gawkiness is quickly set right by the scorn and repartee with which it is instantaneously visited.

To deprive, as happens in all excessive Empires, the intellect of its spontaneity, is a matter of great concern for every national interest. It is this lack of spontaneity that deprives all social meetings, "at homes," or "receptions," of all charm ; that drives people to a nervous hunt for new and ever new "sensations" ; that makes literature approach, with fatal certainty, the type of Chinese classicism ; that gives hundreds of religious "cranks" their incredible chances of success ; that undoes half of the work of all teaching and instructing in the colleges.

To the English mind, any statement of great moral evils seems incomplete and impracticable, unless one adds some expression of indignation at the causes of those evils. It is, however, impossible for the writer to do so. The lack of spontaneity,

or, in other words, the terrible conventionalism covering like a Chinese lacquer all the pores and avenues of social life in Empires, can and must be stated, but can neither be diminished nor removed ; it must therefore not be sneered at nor condemned. It is another heavy price paid for the glory of Imperialism. In Empires intellect is less productive of great achievements in Science, Literature, and Art ; and less adapted for those charms that make social life agreeable. Both the Muses and the Graces have reserved their most enchanting smiles for communities other than excessive Empires.

PART III

*APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES TO BRITISH
IMPERIALISM*

I

BRITISH IMPERIALISM

IN the preceding sketch we arrived at certain propositions expressive of some of the prices and effects of Imperialism in general, and Imperialism other than British. The sketch is short and thin; yet we would ask our readers to be tolerant, and not to confound thinness of outline with superficiality. The British mind, grave under all circumstances, whether dancing or studying, has an irresistible fondness for heavy books with much show of laborious learning. To the average Englishman, and still more so to the average Scot, a book treating of weighty questions must be of considerable weight in avoirdupois itself. Otherwise it appears to them frivolous. Might they not possibly be brought to reflect that a man may very well—and if he is honest, will in fact—formulate his thoughts the more neatly and briefly the more deeply and carefully he has worked them out?

Surely nothing is more striking than the smallness of Galileo's *Dialogi*, or Newton's *Principia*, as against the hugeness of tomes written on physics fifty or a hundred years before Galileo or Newton. At present very much smaller books contain not only what Newton knew, but also most of what has been found out since. The riper the thought, the more pregnantly brief is its form. The reader has a certain means of finding out, after a few weeks, whether a book, small or big, popular or erudite, is or is not a good book. If some of the teachings of the book will come back to the reader's mind, *à propos* of some facts or news, with the force of a sudden flash of light, surprising him afresh, re-energising him, and re-engaging his interest in subjects hitherto neglected by him, then the reader may be sure that the book did contain new and good matter. In the opposite case, the reader ought invariably to conclude that the book is either not fit for him, or not fit for anybody else either.

It is this subsequent effect of ideas, ever so baldly put, ever so much deprived of learned evidence, that tells. Many an author has been told that some of his ideas, or all of them, are "perhaps brilliant," but "hardly solid." This witty remark does not necessarily stand in conflict with the preceding test of the real value of the book. For, various dons,

editors, and scholars, who volunteered this ingenious remark, have, a year or so later, quietly appropriated that "brilliant" idea, passing it off as their own. In this manner the original author, although despising the plagiarist, welcomes the plagiarism, as complete refutation of the judgments of his ponderous critics. Some honest authors will not write big books, except reference books. They know they cannot. They have nothing new to say that requires three stout volumes. Heraclitus of Ephesus has profoundly affected thousands of great thinkers, although we have, in number of words not quite four pages of his sayings.

The lightness or thinness of the outline does not at all impair the fineness and genuineness of the design. Let the reader fill it out. Let the reader too go through some of the mental trouble, labour, and incessant reconstruction of an infinity of facts, which every honest author has gone through, before, at last, the sun of clear insight rose on the horizon. We repeat it: the weightier the subject, the more it is possible, nay, imperative, to arrive, after years of close study, at a brief and pregnant solution. He who cannot do so has not really mastered his subject. He can play it, painfully, in single notes; he cannot march over it in bold octaves.

Few subjects at present are weightier than British Imperialism ; and it is here not attempted to deny that many of its problems do lead to a complication of details defying brief statement. On the other hand, it may be said that whenever the problems of British Imperialism become so entangled in conflicting details that brief statement of their relation and correlation to one another becomes impossible, then ten folio volumes will not bring us much nearer to a fair solution either. Such problems must be left to time.

But when we approach British Imperialism after a comparative study of Imperialism in the past and outside Greater Britain, as we have done here, we are, it may be assumed, in a position to simplify matters to a considerable extent. Having seized the great outlines of the organic life of Imperialism, we are prepared to recognise it in the organism of British Imperialism too. Not only has many a British illustration of the prices paid for Imperialism in general been given in the preceding pages, but it is also self-evident that Great Britain too must pay some of the very heavy prices of Imperialism.

This, as we know from daily experience, does not trouble your average British Imperialist very much. He makes light of it. Naturally. If he

did not make light of it, he would not pay the heavy price. And if at present there were no need of deliberately taking resolutions in regard to British Imperialism ; if matters were suffered to glide along as they were in the major part of the last fifty years ; there would indeed be no necessity of stock-taking, of counting up merchandise and prices ; and British Imperialism might very well be left where people fondly believed it to be : the best of things in the best of worlds.

However, this is no longer the case. Nearly every citizen in Great and Greater Britain is now very keen on arriving at deliberately made resolutions with regard to the great problems of British Imperialism. This cannot be done without conscious and conscientious stock-taking of goods and prices. It is for this reason that we shall here first briefly state to what extent British Imperialism shares the peculiar drawbacks and shortcomings inherent in all Imperialism. Having done which, we shall try to differentiate clearly British Imperialism from all the other types of Imperialism. On the basis so won we may then proceed to a study of the problems of the future.

Imperialism, we saw, must from an inherent necessity constantly and increasingly tend to brow-beat Nature—that is, to stifle that spontaneity and

elasticity of the mind and of the heart which is the real spring of all social charm and intellectual creativeness. The great teachers of Catholic Imperialism have long taught that the realm of Grace [read : the Empire of the Catholic Church] cannot be won without abandoning the realm of Nature. Nothing is more true ; and the orthodox formulation of the doctrine of grace as taught by St. Thomas Aquinas and other Catholic doctors is immeasurably superior to the doctrines of the Protestants, the Jansenists, and other "heretics."

Attention has already been called to the well-ascertained fact that the Spartans, resolutely determined as they were to imperialise the Peloponnesus, "abandoned," that is, browbeat, Nature in the most explicit fashion. So did the Romans ; so do the Americans and the Chinese. The British, largely different in their Imperialism, as we shall soon see, have accordingly not yet arrived at the stage where Nature is totally thrown overboard. There is still some spontaneity left in them outside social gatherings and Art, both of which are conventionalised and sophisticated to a degree.

But the terrible and unmistakable tendency of that Imperialism-begotten self-consciousness to encroach upon an increasing number of forces of the mind ; to spread its deadening lacquer more

and more over the sincerities, sympathies, and spontaneities of our hearts ; this terrible tendency is and always has been evident in British Imperialism too. It has deprived English prose-style of half the figures of speech ; of all the fine movements of query, astonishment, exclamation, delicate irony, subtle undercurrents, and other forms of natural vivacity and spontaneity ; it has tabooed adjectives, and crippled adverbs : in short, it has Laconicised, not Atticised, English prose. It has for ever sterilised British music.

Imperialism and music are two incompatible quantities. At the time when British Imperialism was at its lowest in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a few violets of fine English music were able to push their delicate blossoms through the cold surface ; and in Purcell there was promise of music new and exquisite. But as the Prussians in Germany, Imperialists by historic necessity, have never produced a great musician, so the English, after the commencement of their second great period of Imperialism (*tempore* Queen Anne), have been unable to match their great poets with great musicians of their own. Poets, indeed, the British have had in abundance, and a number of them rank with the great poets of modern times.

Unlike other types of Imperialism, British Im-

perialism has so far not sterilised poetry. On the contrary, there is in English poetical style a wealth of forms, a musical cadence, an Attic *finesse* and delicacy of expression, a morning-dawn of sentiments endowed with all the charms of dream-land, such as one rarely meets in the poetry of other countries. This peculiar excellence of English poetry is owing to the fact that English young men develop at a very early age, in fact before their teens are over, a virility and vigour of character which, coupled with their youthfulness, make them a singular blend of youth and manhood, of dawn and noon, of imagination and judgment, of buds and blossoms. This is naturally productive of a fine poetry. Their early manhood is the gift of their Imperialism; their carefully hidden yet manifest youthfulness they owe to the influence of their women.

Women in England have undergone much of the influence exercised by Imperialism on womanhood in general. Their very aversion to household duties is part of that inner Imperialism that scorns all pettiness and smallness. If Englishwomen in the country cared more for their fowls and poultry than for social advancement, England might very well produce, amongst other things, the eggs for which now over ten million pounds

are paid annually to Denmark and France alone. The disappearance of spontaneity and *naïveté* in Englishwomen, or the direct consequence of secular Imperialism, has made but too marked a progress in our time. No English poet after Shakespeare has succeeded in creating a type of female *naïveté* at once true and beautiful. Shakespeare himself does not excel in those types, although Imperialism in his time was only nascent; and the greatest male type of *naïveté* in English literature was created by an Irishman, by Goldsmith, in his *Vicar of Wakefield*.

This fateful influence of Imperialism on the greatest charm of women is, to any unprejudiced observer, completely proved by the totally different character of Irishwomen. Their beauty and fascination are almost proverbial. They are pre-eminently the *femmes dangereuses*, in that they captivate men both by their physical beauty and by their intellectual vivacity. In their feline grace there is something uncanny; and their vibrating voices overflow their words, as the sea does the shells on the beach. All these qualities cannot, however, account for the singular attractiveness of Irishwomen. It is their *naïveté* that constitutes the essence of their charm.

The Irishwomen, with few exceptions, are not

Imperialists. At any rate, their dislike of England and the English militates in them against the Imperialism introduced by the English. Out of an instinctive antagonism to the influences of Imperialism, Irishwomen cultivate the very *naïveté* that Imperialism dries up in men and women. If people only dropped the preposterous notions of "race," and ceased explaining Irish traits from consideration of the so-called "Celtic" temperament, they would have long ago seen that as Imperialism has written the bass of everything English, antagonism to Imperialism has moulded the great features of Irish character. Even the strange febrility and demoniac changeableness of the Irish character is due to the constant yet ineffective opposition to the ambient air of this kingdom, to Imperialism. A man or woman living in an atmosphere that he or she cordially dislikes, must in the end become demoralised ; and thus unhinged, over-excitabile, febrile. So are the Czechs in Bohemia ; the Poles in Germany or Russia ; and now also the Alsatians in the *Reichsland*.

Womanly *naïveté* is, one must admit, largely imperialised out of the women of England. Yet, with all the loss of her spontaneity, the Englishwoman has not yet come very sensibly nearer to the Roman or American type of imperial womanhood.

She is still intensely modest, meek, yielding, reserved, and full of quiet dignity. When a girl, she does not in the least attempt to browbeat men by her "brightness"; and in England one still meets women who never speak of their knowledge or riches, both of which they frequently possess in a high degree. Her conventionality, it is true, is excessive; and she has therefore a horror of being held natural, or of giving free vent to her spontaneous sentiments. To be "genteel" is her principal ambition; to be considered "ladylike" her greatest object in life.

This is, as everybody knows, the consequence of the peculiar step-pyramid called English society, where each person is singularly anxious to climb from his native "step" to the next higher "step," looking down with contempt on the people beneath him. However, we shall see that the maintenance of this British pyramid of Sakkarah is one of the greatest boons of England, in that Imperialism has thereby been prevented from either democratising or autocratising this country. The women of England, then, by careful scrubbing and repairing of the social step-pyramid, are rendering their country a very great service, if at the price of a conventionality and formalism that deprive them of much of their human capital.

Such women are still necessarily very far from being men in petticoats, and thus their influence on young poets is one of great national value. In another book (*Success among Nations*) the author has tried to draw fuller pictures of the various types of womanhood in Europe and America, and it is needless to repeat here these descriptions. It is, however, necessary to mention, what in the author's *Success* could not be dwelt upon, that the English or American type of womanhood is due almost entirely to the influence of British or American Imperialism. The French, having at no time been Imperialists proper, have developed a womanhood of a totally different kind; just as the women of Tanagra were totally different from the women of Sparta. Accordingly, to take just one phase of female life, in France young girls are kept in absolute seclusion and are allowed practically no social intercourse with young men; in England they enjoy great, in America excessive, liberty.

To compare Englishwomen with French or any other type of Continental women is quite legitimate, providing one never overlooks the dominating fact that Englishwomen are within, and meant for, an Imperialism that is practically unknown on the Continent. Undoubtedly the splendid qualities of Frenchwomen as householders, as mothers, and

dames in the *salons* easily mislead critics to a wholesale condemnation of most Englishwomen, more particularly those of the cheerless middle class. Yet it is the height of injustice to expect imperialist women to be what non-imperialist women alone can and should be.

On the other hand, it is equally unjust and hopeless to claim for Englishwomen that crown of female perfection that Imperialism cannot allow. It is, to those who know, a matter of pity that so many writers and public speakers, by lauding Englishwomen to the echo, are more and more falling into the poor mistake of the Americans. In America, where *naïve* womanhood has reached, and necessarily too, its decrescends this sombre fact is disguised by the loudest proclamation, in innumerable newspaper articles, of the "absolute superiority" and the "immaculate perfection" of the American woman. The Americans or any other imperialist nation might just as well claim the greatest musicians, sculptors, and painters.

The thing is inherently impossible. Women under the influence of Imperialism will inevitably be impaired in some, eventually in most, of their womanly qualities. Nothing can be more certain. One may glory in it, for reasons already given; one may deplore it; one cannot materially change it.

The laborious attempts made by a number of Englishwomen to "raise" the status, mental or social, of women in the United Kingdom by more refined systems of education, by series of instructive lectures, by books and "Unions": all this can do but very little. The type of woman in England as developed by the secular Imperialism of the country can undergo no marked change.

Nor shall it.

And here is the point, where some lever of reform may with profit be applied. To try to alter in its essence the type of English womanhood, *as it is at present*, is impossible, as long as British Imperialism remains what it is at present. But should British Imperialism be artificially wrenched out of its natural path; should it, from being an Imperialism of a singularly moderate and well-poised kind, be twisted into an Imperialism excessive and boundless, then indeed there will be a change in the type of English womanhood. She will with appallingly rapid strides, eventually in one single generation, approach the type of the Roman or American woman more and more closely. Her distinctive excellencies of modesty, dignity, reserve, will disappear like perfume in the swamps. She will become not only Americanised, but Americanised with a vengeance.

People who still cling to the obsolete and long-exploded notion of "race," cannot prevail upon themselves to believe in a rapid and wholesale revolution of the mental and moral powers of a "race." Such people hold that Englishwomen are as they are because they are Anglo-Saxons, Anglo-Celts, Norman-Saxons, and what not. However, history mocks at all these childish conceptions. They are like the animals in our blazonry ; they do not bite, nor do they defend us, although we take much pride in them. Once British Imperialism is pushed on lines of progress deviating from what has hitherto been its road to success, British women will be, as in all excessive Imperialisms, its first victims. They will be decomposed with exasperating rapidity. Homes will cease. Meals will be provided by companies ; children will be educated by telephone ; and since women in excessive Imperialisms do not want to be mothers, children will be imported from the Transvaal, from the Greek Islands, or from South Russia, in accordance with Acts of Parliament. Marriage will be a contract limited to a period of one year or less ; and the majority of women will prefer to swell the ranks of old maids. When all these great achievements will be realised, the British Empire will be drained of all its blood, and of its vital

spirits, and a combination of Belgians and Portuguese will deprive it of one part of its dominion after the other.

This is how Englishwomen are most seriously and directly interested in the great problems of British Imperialism. Let them remember the passage from St. Paul and the real interpretation thereof given above. Let them see that Imperialism is not merely a question of territorial conquest, of fiscal reform, of colonial relations; but also, and pre-eminently, a question of National Life, of the whole scheme and organism of the men and women of a country. As any atmospheric change at once reacts upon the delicate tension of a violin-string, so does any fundamental change in the political atmosphere at once alter the delicate web of women's mind and character.

The women of England cannot, speaking generally, oppose British Imperialism. In doing so they would only condemn themselves. They ought, however, to oppose, with all their might, excessive Imperialism, as a danger far greater to them than either to the nations to be conquered, or to Englishmen conquering them. Englishwomen ought to hold that, while they have fully done their national duty in sacrificing some of their womanly and maternal claims and ideals in order to help

their men in the great and noble work of Imperialism, they are not willing to sacrifice all the treasures of fine womanhood in order to let their men indulge in the luxury of excessive Imperialism.

There must be a limit to sacrifices. Not always will Diana save Iphigenia. Not always will it be possible to hold back the tide of mad jingoism. British Imperialism may be held in check by the other Great Powers of Europe. This may very well be the case ; we shall treat of that later on. But this is no consideration for Englishwomen to dwell upon. Theirs is the duty to weigh all Imperialist proposals mainly with regard to the maintenance of British Imperialism as it is. All radical reforms meant to make the British Empire exclusive, forbidding, self-contained, or, in one word, Byzantinised, imply by necessity an inevitable tendency to sterilise, to unwoman, to defeminise the Englishwoman. Such radical reforms ought therefore to be opposed, combated, and destroyed by the women of Great Britain.

We shall at once attempt to show what constitutes an excessive Imperialism. Even before doing so, it is necessary to recall again to the women of this country that the general attitude that they ought, in their own highest interests,

to assume, is one countenancing moderate or old-British Imperialism only. To the strongest arguments of excessive Imperialists, Englishwomen ought only to retort: "We do not want to become like the matrons of Imperial Rome. If we lose our feminine force altogether, whence shall our sons take their manly vigour? Can you imagine the Gracchi without Cornelia? Let us remain Englishwomen by all means; but *women* as much as *English*."

That Englishmen were formed and moulded by no influence more profoundly than by their secular Imperialism, none but people ignorant either of the English, or their history, can fail to see. The tons of books written on the "racial" elements of the English nation have produced no psychological clue to the character of Englishmen. Even if scholars had succeeded in allotting to each of the so-called "constituent races" of the English people its due share of influence on English character, that would not in the least help us to construe therefrom the character of the English.

There is no arithmetical addition in psychology. As a matter of fact, there is no complete concurrence of opinion with regard to any one of the "racial" theories. What will, on the other hand, furnish us with a psychological, *i.e.* clear and verifiable,

clue to the English character is their secular Imperialism. It is the broadest fact of English history ; its oldest ; its most influential. It is the very atmosphere, climate, and soil of English history. We have already seen why islands must necessarily become Imperialists, or else run the risk of being, as in nearly all known cases they have been, annexed by some Continental Great Power.

This is the keynote to English history to the present day. It is also the keynote to the fundamental features of Englishmen. Imperialists encountering obstacles such as the Romans, the Catholic Church, or the British have encountered must necessarily develop their character and will-power very much more than their intellect. The greater the stress they must lay on their will-power, the less importance they will ascribe to their intellect. Between will-power and intellect there is a feud dating from Adam and before Adam. Animals have little higher intelligence because their reckless will-power devours it. Look at the cat in the moment it prepares to jump at its prey. Nothing stops it ; no reflection, doubt, or mental hesitation makes it waver. It shoots forth straight for its object, unfailingly, relentlessly. Look at the over-mentalised "*intellectuel*." He has so many ideas,

doubts, and mental reserves, that his action remains abortive.

It is likewise quite evident that the English, appreciating, as they do, qualities of character and will-power much more than anything else, will naturally prefer the inductive to the deductive method of thinking. The inductive method appears to be almost exclusively a matter of persistence, patience, and honest hard labour. The deductive method appears to be mere superficial brilliancy. In reality, of course, there is no such thing as inductive thinking without deductive. Yet the appearance of the contrary is quite sufficient to fill the average Englishmen with indifference, if not with contempt, for any book or mental work that does not display the well-known symptoms of much drudgery or, at any rate, of laborious effort. In English no serious book of great fame is a book as small as Montesquieu's *Grandeur et Décadence*, Lessing's *Laokoon*, or Machiavelli's *Principe*.

Considering the preceding fundamental truths, we are prepared to understand why England's greatest poet and her most brilliant prose-writer—why both Shakespeare and Bacon were children of a time (1561 to 1626) when England's first period of Imperialism (1066 or 1154 to 1453) had long subsided, and her second period of Imperialism

had not yet begun. We are likewise prepared to comprehend, after what we have seen in the study of types of Imperialism other than British, that Englishmen, having been under the actual or potential influence of Imperialism these eight centuries, have necessarily toned down their emotional life, and have therefore less need of, and less aptitude for, those social graces that presuppose a richly developed emotionality.

On the other hand, the pettiness and *mesquinerie* of people living in a closely limited society or State is totally absent from the imperial Britons, and they have thus, outside Politics, religious or private interests, the greatest natural inclination towards practising "fair play" and justice. But the English too have long manifested, and will always manifest, that fondness for brooding over ethical and religious problems which, as a phenomenon in huge masses, is an unavoidable effect of Imperialism. Nor is the reason far to seek. Imperialism requires hardy, tenacious men who do not shrink from the less sympathetic and prosaic exigencies of brutal reality.

In fact, to be imperialist a nation must, as we have seen, breed men ready to ignore the amenities of life and face many of the hardest and most uncongenial tasks of rule and subjugation. Such

men cannot possibly let their mothers or sisters exercise a preponderant influence of tenderness and delicate sensitiveness. The quicker the boy leaves the sphere of maternal influence, the more likely he will be to attain the true end of his imperial character within a short time. This ethical influence of the mother, grandmother, sisters, and other female members of the family can, however, never be quite replaced.

It is thus quite true that, in Empires proper, the unit of the community is based on the individual and not on the family; and in the extreme case of Imperialism, in the Catholic Church, this true unit of Empires is established by an unalterable dogma. But it is equally true that the ethical influence of mothers on their sons, up to the age of twenty, can never be replaced by any subsequent effort on the part of the son. It is for this reason that in every Imperialism men constantly hanker for some new religious force, for some new "revival," for a fresh moral and ethical re-energisation of their souls. Having shelved woman, and having thus deprived themselves of the irreplaceable ethical influence of mothers, the men in Empires necessarily and constantly yearn for new religious or semi-religious institutions. This is the clear and indubitable cause of the innumerable sects,

religious fads, and "evangelists" in British or American Imperialism. The Roman Empire was, as every one knows, saturated with such new "religions," until Christianity obtained the upper hand over most of them. The number of religious denominations stands in direct proportion to the inefficiency of mothers.

In this respect too, British Imperialism does not materially differ from any other Imperialism. Should some of the proposals of excessive Imperialists be carried out; should the British Empire become so close-knit, so thoroughly imperialised—that is, Byzantinised—as the Roman Empire was from the second century A.D. onward; then, it may safely be predicted, the rush and mania for ever new religions and "moral" stimulants will assume dimensions that nobody will be able to control. The greatest religious convulsions will seize men; and the present "Welsh Revival" and similar "evangelising" movements will spread as they have never spread before. We shall undoubtedly again see the grotesque and terrible spectacle of the wildest civil commotions caused by popular differences on matters of the subtlest theological and metaphysical problems; and the city of London will, a new Alexandria, be sacked by conflicting theological parties, each proclaiming their view of the Trinity

as the most vital concern of every honest British citizen.

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We have so far outlined, in addition to incidental remarks in preceding parts, that influence of British Imperialism on the British which is in more or less complete agreement with the influence exercised by Imperialism, Roman, American, or Catholic. We now hasten to point out the peculiar difference between British and non-British Imperialism. This difference is indeed very great and essential. It is by ignoring it, it is by placing British Imperialism on all fours with Imperialism in America, or elsewhere, that many of the gravest mistakes have been made, or, we beg to submit, are being made, by politicians and statesmen with regard to the future of the British Empire.

We saw above that one of the most marked and most injurious consequences of Imperialism is the well-nigh irresistible tendency to level down people in one essential respect or another. There is little doubt that many, if not all, of the deficiencies of Imperialism may be traced back to this fatal uniformity of social type, will, or intellect. Now, it is the inestimable privilege of the British that this baneful uniformity has at no time, in the British Empire, reached a degree of intensity in any

way comparable with uniformity in the Roman, American, Chinese or Catholic Empire.

On the contrary, the British have at all times manifested an almost fanatic predilection for individualism in the widest sense of the word. Compare the unmistakable change in the pronunciation of vowels and consonants from county to county in England, with the absolutely uniform pronunciation from New York to San Francisco. Compare the excessively individualised, not to say atomised, law of the English, deposited in thousands of volumes of *Precedents*, with the clear, short *Codes* of the Romans. Compare the English fashion, not to say mania, for individual occurrences, or facts, and their positive dislike of generalisations, or de-individualised facts, with the love of system in America or France. Compare the British antipathy to maps, in which a thousand individual features of a country are generalised into one line, with the admiration and love of maps in Germany, Austria, Hungary, America, and other countries. Compare the deep-seated ambition of most Englishmen or Scotsmen to individualise themselves in the intensest manner, regardless of the risk of becoming ridiculous or grotesque, with the anxious care of an American not to appear a "crank."

These precious_ features are not what history

has taught us to expect in an Imperialism. They are due to the fact, unique in its kind, that the British Empire has never formed, and never can form, one contiguous territory. It consists of (i) a small double-island, Great Britain and Ireland, and (ii), thousands of miles away, of various huge colonies and dependencies. This geographical feature has prevented the rapid spread of those forces making for uniformity which Imperialism has, as a rule, never failed to set in motion. The sea gave England her Empire ; the sea likewise saved England from falling a victim to one of the most injurious effects of Imperialism.

In Australia indeed, it being a large continent, uniformity has clearly made but too serious an inroad on that British individualism which, as the great counterpoise to some of the fatal consequences of Imperialism, is of the utmost national importance. In Canada, thanks to the "parochialism" of the French Canadians, there is less of that "Americanisation" or levelling-down of types and characters that one but too frequently meets in Australasians. By cultivating rugged, if angular, individualism, men in England perform, and ought to perform, the same kind of national sentinel-duty that Englishwomen, as we have seen, perform by their over-conventionalised social life and adoration of

caste. Men in England cannot afford to be *des natures rondes*, and thus to sacrifice the dearly bought but most wholesome principle of individualism which the French, for instance, do not need and so can very well afford to change into their principle of *D'abord, soyons aimables*.

This precious individualism of the English, then, is intimately connected with the central fact that British Imperialism is grafted upon, and chiefly maintained by, a small home country; a country, which from its very smallness is naturally endowed with all the forces that love to individualise institutions, classes, tastes, and political interests. All the countries of Europe, outside Russia, are relatively small—even Sweden, owing to the sterility of so much of its area, being a small country—and all of them have for many centuries shown that Hellenic bent for high-strung individualisation. In small Bavaria there is an endless number of individual customs, beliefs, folklore, mental and moral attitudes, costumes, amusements, etc. etc. So it is in every other country in Europe, which, as the author has ventured to call it, is the true Greater Hellas.

England is to Europe what Venice was to Italy. Of the Great Republic it used to be said that it was a State in Italy, without being an Italian State.

Of England we may say that she is a State in Europe, without being a European State. In this one geo-political and all-decisive circumstance is consummated the distinctive character not only of England, but also of the British Empire. Although long an Empire proper, England is yet but one of the "countries" of Europe, sharing in the first place that pre-eminently and exclusively European or neo-Hellenic tendency towards individualism. It is by this her European character that England, alone amongst all Empires proper, has been enabled to stave off that intellectual decomposition and desiccation which, as we have seen, is threatening every Empire and undermining the vitality of excessive Imperialism.

Alone of all Empires, England can point to her intellectual achievements with the same pride as to her imperialising activity. The Romans, let alone the Byzantines, Russians, or the Americans, have never produced geniuses such as England gloried in, even in the eighteenth century. The Romans had their Scipios, their Gracchi, their Cæsar, Augustus, Hadrian, and Marcus Aurelius ; but can the elder Pliny compare with Newton ? Or Virgil with Shakespeare ? Or Seneca with Bacon ? The average Englishman has perhaps an exaggerated idea about the exceeding value of English literature ;

and he is apt to assume that, perhaps with the exception of the French, no other modern nation has a literature equal to that of the British. This cannot be maintained seriously. Other nations too have marvellously gifted authors, and much might be said against English prose literature.

But however that may be, it is certain that the British have produced a body of literary works, and even works of art proper, of imperishable value, of the first magnitude. No other Imperialism proper has ever done that. We said above that England's greatest poetic genius was given her at a period of lull in British Imperialism. This does not in the least impair the statement just made of the specific relation between British Imperialism and British Intellect. It is part of the very nature of British Imperialism that it has, owing to England's character as a European country, never quite escaped retarding or even blighting influences from the Continent. Repeatedly (from 1369 to 1374; from 1429 to 1453; from 1563 to 1564; in 1588; from 1664 to 1667; from 1688 to 1692; from 1775 to 1783; to mention only some of the cases), repeatedly England was made to feel that peculiarly European state of mind of being on the constant *qui vive*; or incessantly on the alert against imminent and great

dangers, which on the Continent each country has been and is undergoing, without any notable interruption, to our own days.

For over two generations after 1815, it is true, England was in a position radically different from that of any other European country, in that her shores were practically immune from even the possibility of invasion ; no other European nation, except to a certain extent the French, having a navy to speak of. At present, however, this "European character" of England is once again most clearly evident. Not only does England share exposure to sudden invasion with all the rest of the nations in Europe, but it is in a situation of far greater exposure than most European nations.

In fact, it cannot be seriously questioned that England is at present, of all European countries, the most threatened, the most exposed to a Titanic struggle for existence. Leaving the Turk out of consideration, there is no nation on the continent of Europe that need just now apprehend an unprovoked invasion. Each of them may be invaded at any given moment ; each of them is bound to maintain a never-flagging vigilance, as of old. Yet none of them is entitled to say that its neighbour has a serious or vital interest to attack it. France is fully aware of the absolute unaggressiveness of

Germany with regard to France. Germany does not dream of appropriating one single town in France ; and as to the French Colonies, Germany is equally conscious of the fact that a naval war with France would inevitably entail a naval war with England at the same time. Rather than fight both England and France on the sea at a time, Germany would certainly prefer to fight England alone, and eventually secure far better colonies in case of victory.

From all this it follows irresistibly that neither France nor Germany need apprehend sudden war with one another unless they provoke it deliberately. The Frenchmen now in power will, as all the world knows, never provoke war with Germany. As to Austria-Hungary, there is, as the author has repeatedly essayed to show, not the slightest real danger for a war with Germany. A weak Austria, or Austria as she is now and as she will be for some time to come, is a far better asset for Germany than the doubtful conquest of Bohemia would be. Of Italy, Spain, Holland, etc., it is needless to treat in detail. Russia has her hands too full in the Far East to think of being aggressive in Europe.

With England it is quite different. England will have, both in Europe and in Asia, resolute and powerful adversaries to confront ere long. In

Europe, Germany is inevitably committed to a policy of aggression against England. In Asia, Russia is bound to gravitate to the Indian Ocean—that is, to come into conflict with England.

As long as there were two or more “systems” of traditional hostilities on the Continent—such as that between the Bourbons and Hapsburgs, the Dutch and the Spanish, Prussia and Austria, etc.—the English were, as umpires or as partisans often in a commanding position. These “systems” are at present in complete or quite latent abeyance; and the possible direct interference of England on the Continent is becoming more and more of an academic character. This very abeyance of continental hostilities has, in addition to reasons of increasing population, commercial rivalry, and spreading wealth, filled the Germans with a natural desire for imperial expansion.

This they might very well realise, even diplomatically, by incorporating Holland and her vast colonies with the German Empire, without attainting the national or political individuality of the Dutch at all. The Dutch, if consenting, would enter the German Empire on the same conditions that Bavaria or Baden has joined it. They would retain their political, judicial, and administrative organisation, and yet form part of the German Empire.

This, however, England cannot, and will not, allow, except if forced to do so. Not only has it always been a set principle of British policy for the last two hundred years that he who touches on Holland touches on England, but there are moreover other and far more cogent reasons for England's opposing any attempt of Germany on Holland.

The Dutch have, as every one knows, a most considerable Colonial Empire in Asia. In fact, it is, in area, seven-elevenths of the territory in India under direct British administration, while the population of the Dutch Colonies in the East Indies amounts to about 36,000,000. If now these vast territories, so close to British India, should, by the incorporation of Holland with the German Empire, fall into the hands of Germany, England would, in Asia, be wedged in between Russia and Germany. It is evident that Java, Sumatra, most of Borneo, Celebes, etc., in the hands of the weak Dutch represent a neighbourhood more convenient and infinitely less expensive than these colonies would be when in the hands of the Germans. Before, however, pursuing this subject we may well pause a moment to concentrate our attention on the main issue of this pamphlet.

Given, that of all countries England, and thus also the British Empire, are the most exposed to

attacks of a formidable kind, it becomes at once clear that the original question with which we started—to wit, whether the problems of British Imperialism are matters of Home or of Foreign Policy—must now be definitely decided as referring mostly to Foreign Policy. The reader may not yet feel convinced that England *is* the most exposed of European countries at the present period, which includes the next four or five years. He may even think that Russia is far more exposed, being, as she is, signally worsted by the Japanese on sea, and morally beaten on land ; while Russia's interior is “seething” with a formidable unrest of her vast population.

We would here ask the reader to suspend his judgment, and to wait for subsequent remarks on the international position of England. As to Russia, the author can only repeat what he wrote in August 1904 (published in the *Fortnightly Review*, January 1905), “Should the Japanese in the present war signally defeat the Russians, Russian absolutism will inevitably come out stronger than ever before.” As long as the Japanese continue to be victorious, there will be no revolution in Russia. The Tsar or a number of individual officials may be assassinated ; there may be local revolts and disturbances, but a revolution proper there will

not be before the end of the present war. As to the probable ultimate success of the Japanese we shall speak later on.

Given, then, that England and British Imperialism are at present largely a problem of Foreign Policy, we must naturally examine all the proposals, suggestions, or councils of statesmen as to the future of British Imperialism, not only from the probable effect of those proposals and suggestions on the home or interior situation of the Empire, but also and more particularly from their probable effect on the international position of England. This international position is now radically different from what it was before 1870. This is the clue to all the questions. He who overlooks that; he who deems England to be still where she was before the Unity of Germany, the immense expansion of Russia, the rise of the Japanese, etc., commits a fateful blunder.

The well-known saying that Europe is an organism, and not, like Africa or Asia before the advent of the Europeans, a mere conglomeration of peoples and tribes, is fraught with great consequences. A fundamental change in one of the organs of Europe, say, Germany or Austria-Hungary, at once reacts most perceptibly on every other country in Europe. Since 1870 there have been more than one or two such fundamental changes.

Shall England alone of all the countries escape their influence? It is needless to dwell on a point so evident.

The central fact, then, of all the problems of British Imperialism, the fact that bears most heavily on each of the issues and queries regarding British Imperialism, is the altered international position of Great Britain. Most seriously rivalled by the Germans in nearly all commercial and industrial enterprises, Great Britain is moreover very seriously threatened by the Germans as an aggressive naval power. One need only read the current periodicals and political literature of the Germans for a few weeks, to be quite convinced that it is the German nation, and not only the German Government, that is, with regard to England, filled with one of those historic antipathies and hostilities that must before long come to a head in the shape of a war. Such deep-seated animosity does not require much kindling.

The Germans consider themselves, and with no poor show of reason, as one of the most powerful and best endowed nations in the world. In war they have proved to be superior to their southern and western rivals; in peace they may boast an intellectuality envied at least by the Professors of all the other nations; an art, music, in which they

are supreme ; and a trade and industry rapidly outstripping rivals east and west. Considering that they are cooped up in the centre of Europe with a population of close on sixty millions in an area just a trifle larger than France, it is but too natural that they must think of colonial expansion, of Imperialism. To this, their great aim and object, there is only one serious obstacle : England.

We have already mentioned that the Germans mean to incorporate Holland with the German Empire. We now add that the Dutch themselves may at present be infinitely more inclined to listen to the German *Loreley*, than before. The rise of Japanese Imperialism is a great danger to no European nation, except to the Dutch. At this writing (January 1905), the Japanese are indeed credited with ultimate victory over the Russian Army as well. This, however, may safely be discounted as a piece of prediction based on wrong strategy. An island people cannot definitely drive out a great continental nation from the continent. We already remarked that the English in the Middle Ages, in spite of brilliant single victories, could not hold France ; nor could the Swedes hold Germany ; nor could the Hellenes hold Persia. It is inherently impossible.

But the Japanese may and probably will establish

an island Empire in the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean ; and one of the first to suffer at the hands of the Japanese will be the Dutch. This statement is a mere restatement of geographical, that is, unalterable, facts. The Dutch colonies in the East Indies are the natural objective of the Japanese, whose advanced post, Formosa, furnishes them with an excellent naval base. The Dutch, in their natural anxiety not to lose their colonies to the Japanese, will be much more willing to listen to German proposals of Incorporation. The Dutch colonies, officially protected by the enlarged German Empire, are not likely to fall into the hands of the Japanese. Those colonies must, unless they are taken in hand by a Great Power, share the fate of the Spanish colonies in the West Indies.

However, one might say that this protecting Power may be England. But apart from the present Anglo-Japanese alliance, England has no possible legal machinery to take Holland officially under her protection. Incorporate Holland she cannot. A special offensive or defensive alliance between Holland and England would necessarily be considered as an "unfriendly act" by Japan, and by Germany at the same time. There remains therefore one possible solution only : Holland's incorporation with the German Empire.

But no sooner have the vast Dutch colonies become German, than Germany has driven a wedge between Australia and British India and a semicircle of lines of direct attack on the southern portions of British India. How under these conditions a conflict between Germany and England can be avoided, it is difficult to see.

This conflict, be it noted, will in all probability not be started by the Germans without a concurrent conflict between Russia and England. The Germans have for the last 143 years had no military conflict whatever with Russia; nor are they in the least likely to have one in the near future. Apart from other reasons, both Germany and Russia have, in their Polish questions, a bond of amity stronger than all counter-interests. Both Empires have, on the other hand, the common interest of weakening England. Even should the German fleet never be equal to the British, it would yet tax British naval resources to the utmost to carry on simultaneously a naval war with Germany and a land war with Russia.

It can no longer be overlooked that the danger to England sketched in the preceding lines is of a very serious character. That under these conditions the English will soon be compelled to think of creating a modern army of about a million highly

trained and equipped men, seems manifest. But what is equally certain is the necessity of ensuring those solid alliances which, ever since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) the Great Powers of Europe have always carefully studied and cultivated. Alliances are not half as useful in actual war, as in the preventing of war.

This is a very considerable advantage. Of these possible alliances, that with America is quite out of court. In spite of all pleasant talk about the kinship of the "Anglo-Saxon race" (a "race" in America consisting mostly of Dutchmen, Austrians, Hungarians, Bohemians, Russians, and negroes); in spite of all allegations of a few ponderous journals to the contrary, it is as plain as a b c that an Empire like the United States cannot seriously wish to become the real ally of another Empire, such as the British. Apart from Canada, which the States never lose sight of, there is in the alliance of two Empires an inherent contradiction of interests that will never stand the test of the first trial.

We saw above that Russia may and probably will join Germany against England. However, this alliance is no true alliance; it would merely mark the intention of Russia and Germany to strike at England simultaneously, but not with joined armies. Between the British Empire and the American there

is no common political or commercial interest. Of all nations, the British are least liked by the Americans. It is hopeless to contest a fact patent to any non-English visitor to the States. Nor is there anything to marvel at in this singular antipathy of the Americans. The Briton as an individual is, in the whole of his mental and moral economy, the very opposite of the American. However great the similarities between the two imperial nations *quâ* Imperialists, their more intimate differences are most marked and mutually most unsympathetic.

Moreover, every nation, as it wants a great Ideal of Hope and Ambition, so it also wants a Great Hatred to feed its more sombre passions with. The Americans have none but the British to hate. But even if all this antipathy of the Americans towards the English should abate, or even change into sympathy, America can never be of any particular use or assistance to England in the coming struggles with Russia or Germany. In an Anglo-American alliance there is no real life, no true point. It is, on the contrary, but too likely that between the States and England there will be more than one point of friction, as soon as the Panama or Nicaragua Canal will be completed, and thus the Pacific opened for the competitive activity of both nations.

The American Alliance being out of the question, there remain only alliances in Europe. Now that there is a solid *entente cordiale* with France, the first step towards a well-balanced foreign policy has been made. France, temporarily under the influence of a few barren *intellectuels*, is in reality a poor ally. England is threatened by most warlike adversaries ; France is not. England will soon have to face war, on sea and on land. France publicly declares that it does not want war either on sea or on land. With a philosophical government such as the Cabinets now changing hands in France, there is no reason to assume that the incorporation of Holland by Germany would sensibly ruffle the Platonic mind of France. This tends to suggest the idea that the *entente* with France is not a very great asset for England, unless France, maintaining her sympathetic attitude for England, fundamentally changes her attitude to the rest of Europe. This she will ; there is little doubt of that. France always turns excessively humanitarian and peace-loving after crushing defeats.

After the Peace of Versailles in 1763, when France was humiliated to a then unprecedented extent, Rousseau's sentimentalism and *sensibilité* at once became the rage of all France. So are now

les intellectuels. Anatole France, their principal literary representative, revels in a hero of his novels who meekly philosophises at the sight of his outraged marital honour. This is typical. So even do the *intellectuels* behave at the sight of the outraged military honour of France ; they philosophise ; they talk *lumière* and *humanité*. One day they will be categorically told to stop their Byzantine rhetoric, and then France may indeed make an alliance with England such as will redound to the glory and profit of both nations.

It would be a grave error to assume that France is the only possible ally or "good friend" of England in Europe, and that the other Powers may safely be neglected in diplomatic considerations. Some twenty or thirty years ago, the average Briton did indeed think that Continental Europe consisted mostly of a number of Montenegros rotating round the British Sun. There is reason to hope that this view is no longer held by the majority of the British nation.

Neither Italy nor Austria-Hungary are negligible quantities. They may eventually become of first-rate importance to England. If there is one clear and unmistakable lesson taught by European history, it is the solidarity of interests and the possible importance of any one State or nation of

Europe with regard to all the rest of the nations. It is very probable that the neglect of Hungarian interests by Napoleon III., in the sixties of the nineteenth century, deprived France of Austro-Hungarian help in 1870. The small nation of the Roumanians proved to be of signal assistance to the Russians in the Turkish War of 1877-78.

Given that England is still in Europe and, with regard to the population and wealth of the United Kingdom, still preponderantly in Europe, it is, we beg to submit, a matter of the utmost importance to study the interests and influences of all the Powers of Europe in order to place British Foreign Policy on a sound basis. The present crisis in Hungary, as can easily be shown, may very well have an immense importance for England, in that Hungary, ever more disfranchising herself from Austria even as an ally or confederate state, may ultimately gravitate towards the Balkan Peninsula and thus become a serious factor in the Near East.

* * * * *

The upshot of the preceding considerations was the statement that England, still preponderantly a European Power, has most urgent motives to study the interests and forces of all the other Powers of Europe, before deciding on any new scheme of British Imperialism. It is impossible to judge any

reform or scheme bearing on the future of British Imperialism, from consideration of the interests of British Colonies and the "Mother Country" alone. In fact, the tendency to excessive Imperialism, with all the grave drawbacks it entails, is fostered by nothing more effectively than by a deliberate disregard of all interests other than those of the Colonies.

Even if these interests were all of the same character, it would be a serious blunder to sacrifice to them the study of international interests indicated by the nature of England as a European power. In reality, the interests of the Colonies are most conflicting. Canada, geographically at any rate, not unlikely to be absorbed by the Americans, is for this reason alone essentially different from Australia, that has no such absorption to dread or to anticipate. South Africa still harbours a large number of profoundly disaffected members of the British Empire ; and he has never read a line of Boer documents, letters, or newspapers who believes in the absolute loyalty of the late enemy. India, as a mere province, is again totally different, and needs quite special treatment. Under these conditions it is evident that the problem of the British Colonies, being by far the more complicated and less general, must be preceded by the study

of the international position of England, as the more general and less complicated problem.

In this respect we cannot but see that the proposal of a *blocus britannique*, or in other words the proposal of Mr. Chamberlain, suffers from most of the defects that its predecessor, the *blocus continental* of Napoleon, suffered in its time. Reduced to its simplest terms, Mr. Chamberlain's proposal comes to this, that the British Empire shall imitate the example of Napoleon's Empire in 1806, and almost hermetically close itself from the rest of the world by a series of preferential tariffs in favour of the Colonies. Napoleon's scheme was a complete failure, as every one knows; and General Marbot tells us in his most valuable *Mémoires*, how Napoleon was compelled to connive at the open breaches of his *blocus* at the hands of his own Marshals, who sold licences for British importers. A *blocus britannique* would be the deliberate isolation of Great Britain, the undoing of its natural and geo-political position as a European Power. To set her up in defiance to and seclusion from the rest of Europe would render hopeless any attempt at utilising European forces of assistance or friendship by means of alliances or *ententes cordiales*.

Suppose the tariff, as proposed by Mr. Chamberlain, is introduced. Can any one seriously think

that France would then have the same interest in an Anglo-French alliance that she has at present ? England cannot possibly restore Alsace-Lorraine to France ; in other words, England cannot render France the only great service France is in need of. If, now, England, by a protective tariff, sensibly reduces the financial profits made by Frenchmen in trade with England, the *entente cordiale* will soon have little heart left in her. France may indeed do England a priceless service, in case of any mishap in the North Sea. France can at once offer substantial naval assistance. No British colony can do as much. Geography is against it. Alliances are only of value as long as they are based on an accurately measured and equalised "*give-and-take*."

It is in vain for protectionists to point out that Continental countries are nearly all protectionist, and yet have alliances. The Continental countries are utterly different from Great Britain. We have seen how different they necessarily must be in mental and moral temper, not being imperialist. In matters political and financial they are also different. Each of them can, by its geographical position, render immediate service to its neighbours in case of emergency ; each of them is thus sure that some of its neighbours will be glad to conclude treaties of friendship or even alliance without being

induced thereto by merely financial advantages. Great Britain is in no such geographical position. The chief services that Great Britain can render to Continental countries are only two : one, a very great and vital politico-military service ; the other, economic advantages. The politico-military service is to contain the undue aspirations of Germany.

By giving Germany a wholesome lesson in international modesty—by reducing German Imperialism to proportions of moderation—Great Britain would render a service of incalculable value to the minor nationalities, especially to Austria-Hungary. Just as the Japanese by revealing the real military weakness of Russia (a weakness clearly pointed out in the author's *Success among Nations*, long before the Russo-Japanese War) have silenced Slav arrogance in Austria to a considerable extent, even so Great Britain, victorious over Germany, would infinitely strengthen the hands of the Magyars in Hungary, and thus indirectly of all the Danubian and Balkan nationalities. If Germany beat Great Britain too, on sea, then the absorption of most of Austria-Hungary by Germany would be a mere question of time. If Great Britain allows Pan-Germanism to grow excessive, the Germanisation of Central and South-eastern Europe would become an inevitable necessity.

This toning-down of Germany, so necessary, as we have seen, in England's own interest, is also undoubtedly necessary in the interest of numerous minor nations in Europe. As long, however, as England has not accomplished this measure, the greatest service England renders most Continental nations is the very Free Trade which the proposal of the protectionists means to abolish. With the cessation of Free Trade, one vast political consequence is absolutely certain to ensue. We shall speak of it forthwith. The economic consequences of the contemplated abolition of Free Trade, are, to be honest, quite in the dark.

The interminable array of statistical facts, economic reasonings, and argumentation published on this question in the last twelvemonth has sufficiently proved but one thing: that Political Economy is not yet in a position to decide with scientific certainty whether Protection would or would not increase the financial prosperity of the country. It has, for this reason, been deemed superfluous to worry the reader with a thousandth and ten thousandth repetition of statistical fireworks. It is, on the other hand, quite different with the political consequences of the abolition of Free Trade.

Few things in European politics can be more certain than the necessity of changing the whole

military and naval organisation of both Great Britain and the Colonies, in case that Free Trade should ever be abolished. Once Great Britain has cut her strongest bond of amity with Continental nations, her Free Trade policy, she will inevitably be driven into militarism of an extreme kind. An army of one million highly trained men *may* be sufficient; conscription will probably be necessary. Moreover, the Colonies will be compelled to have numerous highly trained armies of their own and, more particularly, contribute substantially to the British Navy, and not, as hitherto, only nominally. This consequence follows the abolition of Free Trade with mathematical certainty.

Great Britain practising a *blocus britannique* is no longer of much interest to the Continental nations, unless she develops at the same time into a military power, on land as well as on sea, of the first order. It is plain that the burden of such militarism would eat up most of the financial prosperity alleged to ensue on the abolition of Free Trade. It is equally undeniable that a *blocus britannique* deprives England of all leverage in making alliances or in coming to "understandings" that may eventually relieve her of many an awkward or costly position or emergency.

Cobden certainly erred in the main assumption underlying his belief in Free Trade. He thought that the world was, thanks to spreading "civilisation," ever more nearing the time when wars, hostilities, and similar "barbarities" would cease altogether. He forgot that "civilisation" is for the most part the direct outcome of those very wars he so much deprecated. It is needless to show how Cobden's anticipation of a European Peace has been discounted by European history since his time. He was, however, apparently right in assuming that Great Britain would, for a long time, be free from any warlike operations in her own territory.

England was, indeed, for more than two generations after Waterloo in a state of practical immunity from attack. Accordingly the State revenue of England might during that time very well remain a moderate one, and taxation need not rise in proportion to the rise of national wealth. But if Cobden was mistaken in assuming that this immunity would continue for more than two or three generations, the protectionists at present are equally wrong in assuming that England can, under all circumstances, rely on her own resources, without seeking for "friendliness" or "understandings" among the rest of the European Powers.

The protectionists are right in saying that the main assumption of Cobden, *i.e.* England's practical immunity from attack, having ceased to be operative, the British State-Revenue too ought to undergo a change—that is, ought, for purposes of defence, to be raised. How this augmentation of the Revenue shall be realised is, however, a mere question of financial detail. It cannot be made into the “soul of the nation.” It cannot be bloated up into a measure of the greatest national importance. For it is more than problematic to say that by the adoption of a Protectionist Tariff alone can England be enabled to “retain” her Colonies and Empire.

Empires are not “retained” by tariffs. William the Conqueror did not “retain” England by Domesday Book ; he “retained” England by the Battle of Hastings, and by similar measures after 1066. Napoleon did not “retain” his Empire by his Berlin and Milan Tariff-decrees ; but by the battles of Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland. German Unity was not made by the *Zollverein*, but by the battles of Sadowa and Sedan.

The arguments of numerous Canadians tending to show the “inevitable” absorption of the Dominion by the United States are very strong indeed. It seems, at any rate, quite certain that Canadian

loyalty will not be sensibly strengthened by mere tariffs. Loyalty is not born of money-considerations, nor can it be strengthened by them. Loyalty is the result of national pride. Feed that pride, and you may rely on its offspring, loyalty. Let Great Britain, by victorious conflicts with Germany or Russia, again demonstrate the great power and far-seeing wisdom of the British Empire, and all the allurements of the Americans will be unable to shake Canadian loyalty, whether there be Preferential Tariffs or no. The Irish have been given all the advantages in the Empire that any Englishman may enjoy ; yet the majority of them have preferred to leave the Empire altogether. The Boers are being promised the free use of all the financial and political resources of the Empire ; yet there is not five per cent. of them who have sincerely attached themselves to the Empire.

Has not the study of the history and nature of Imperialism, as sketched in the preceding chapters, clearly and conclusively shown that Empires require on the part of their citizens a readiness for sacrifices far greater than that entailed upon citizens of small states ? Is it meant to be given out that such sacrifices can be made acceptable or even entirely removed by payments of sums gained by advantageous tariffs ? Or is it really intimated

that if, *e.g.*, Australia should be offered better tariffs by Germany, Australia would therefore cut loose from Great Britain?

If we take into consideration that Australia will very soon have a military interest of the most vital force to contribute substantially to the British Navy and to cling with the utmost loyalty to the "Mother Country," we cannot but consider Preferential Tariffs, *qua* imperial tonics, as very poor and superfluous nostrums. Australia may very soon have close to her northern borders either both the Japanese and the Germans—the latter as the successors of the Dutch—or the Japanese alone; or the Japanese, the Americans, and the Germans, the latter as possessors of part of New Guinea, the Bismarck Islands, the Mariana Islands, etc. The mere possibility of such a neighbourhood will induce every patriotic and prudent Australian to hesitate a long while before deciding on his loyalty to the British Empire on the strength of mere tariff profits.

The same species of remarks holds good for South Africa. The evident disaffection of the Boers will instil British patriotism into most citizens of Cape Colony or Natal more efficiently than any possible tariff could ever do. The Colonies will soon learn that there is no part of the globe

where European Great Powers in general, let alone Great Britain, can be disregarded without imminent penalties.

Taking matters simply on the basis of interests, of cold and calculated interests, there is no reason whatever to assume that any one of the self-governing colonies of the British Empire can afford to cut loose from the "Mother Country," within the next two or three generations. The Cape cannot think of secession, from the natural apprehension not only of a renewed Boer rising, but also of the loss of the immense Hinterland of the Cape from the Orange River to Egypt, which an Empire alone can hold against all the competing Great Powers. Australia and New Zealand cannot secede, for reasons given above.

An outbreak of war between Germany and England is a direct and immediate blow at Australasia ; so is a war between Japan and Holland ; so is an aggressive American policy in the neighbourhood of the Philippines ; so is the inevitable arrival of Russia on the southern shores of Persia. The south-east of Asia is clearly destined to become, and in no long time from now, the theatre of as great a political, military, and naval activity as has in the last two hundred years been the case with the north-west of Europe.

How under these circumstances can Australasia afford to secede from Great Britain? Even if she did so to-day, she would, a few days later, be compelled to implore the alliance of Great Britain at any cost. Elementary common-sense will tell any Australasian that since European Powers have the major influence in south-east Asia, *i.e.* in the immediate neighbourhood of Australasia, it would be the height of folly to estrange one of the greatest Powers, and on sea *the* greatest Power of Europe.

And since the African, Australasian, and Indian portions of the British Empire are not at all likely either to wish or to be able to secede, it is still less likely that the Canadians should wish to abandon the glorious heritage of their ancestors. Their imperial sentiments cannot but become stronger if, as is to be presumed, England will meet the coming difficulties with adequate means of success. We have seen that even ignorant Russians, for Imperialism's sake, abstain from unduly pressing their claims to popular government during the Russo-Japanese War.

At any rate, we again venture to predict (January 29, 1905) that there will be no revolution in Russia during the present war. And shall Canadians forsake England in her fight for the consolidation of British Imperialism? To assume such a

possibility were to underrate national *amour propre* in an elementary manner. The very dangers threatening England and her Colonies are a complete guarantee of solid cohesion between the Mother and her Children. To doubt that cohesion, is to misconstrue or ignore those dangers. The American Colonies did not secede from Great Britain during the great war from 1755 to 1763, when England was obliged to fight for her imperial and even her home existence, all over Central Germany, in North America, in India, and in nearly all the seas. The Colonials seceded from 1775 onwards, when England was at an unprecedented height of power, and practically safe from attack unless provoked by her. The lesson is but too clear.

Add to this, that the Colonials seceded (as the author has shown in his *Foundations of Modern History*) from the concourse of two vast causes, neither of which can be said to be operative in the present British Colonies. One of these causes was purely geographical : the fact that the American Colonials learned during 1755-63 that theirs was, and ought to be, the most valuable Hinterland that any country outside Europe has ever possessed. The other cause was the combination of several great European Powers against England.

The geographical cause holds good neither in

Canada nor in Australia ; and even if it did, England is not likely to repeat the blunder of George III. to prevent Canadians and Australians from occupying their Hinterlands. The political cause does hold good to a certain extent, in that Germany and Russia are both decidedly hostile to England ; but, for reasons given above, this hostility, far from encouraging the Canadians or the Australasians to an attempt at secession, cannot but confirm them in a whole-hearted loyalty to England.

* * * * *

In the preceding reflections we have placed ourselves deliberately on the basis of considerations purely selfish, egoistic, and prompted by sheer material interests. It was necessary to do so, in order to show that the principal thesis here maintained will stand examination from any given legitimate standpoint. This thesis, this pervading principle underlying every one statement here advanced, is the fact that the British Empire, being in some ways radically different from similar Empires either in the past or in the present, must necessarily deviate from them in all measures political or financial as well. Systems of Imperialism other than British are, it cannot be denied, decidedly protectionist ; and even in the past they nearly always were.

This fact, far from being able to serve as an argument in favour of British Protectionism, is evidently militating against such an argument. The British Empire, being *sui generis*, must be treated accordingly. British Imperialism fares largely as did, for a long time, the greatest intellect of England, Shakespeare. It is strangely mistaken, misinterpreted, ignored, or disliked. Keeping aloof, as we must do, from mere jingoism on the one hand and from mere philanthropic or socialistic Little Englanderism on the other, we cannot but arrive at the following view of British Imperialism :

The British were already in the twelfth century A.D. driven into Imperialism. Their kings then had no other choice ; and later on, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the people itself was placed in historical space in a manner that left the British no possible way out of their difficulties other than Imperialism. Whatever the British may have *said*, *i.e.* spoken about their Colonies and Empire ; however pooh-poohingly they may have talked of their oversea dominions, all this was only part of that make-believe which is inevitable in any Empire, and which, as we have seen, is the fountain of that characteristic humour of Empires, from Lucian to Mr. Mark Twain.

In utter contrast to the American or Russian

type of Imperialism, the British Empire has grown up so slowly, with so many interruptions, apparent reversals, and pauses, that it has never quite lost its original dual character. In this "dual character," we take it, the very essence and distinctive soul of Great Britain is consummated. By "dual character" is meant that the British Empire consists of (i) a small, self-contained double island, and (ii) of a vast number of territories separated from Great Britain by oceans.

This duality gave Great Britain, amongst all Empires, the inestimable gift of being able to retain many of the forces that, in smaller, self-contained countries, such as France, have always made for a richer and more intense development of the human capital both mental and moral; and, at the same time, to win those new and Imperialism-born forces that, if bought at heavy prices, are yet undoubtedly productive of much that is noble, humanitarian, and great.

In the first chapters of this pamphlet we have tried to show the unmistakable teaching of history to the effect that the attempt of some nations at being Athenians and Romans at the same time has always been doomed to failure. Excessive Imperialism does desiccate many of the forces of our human intellect and heart; excessive Imperialism

does unnatural woman in one way or another; excessive Imperialism does drive people into a dead uniformity and into an undue brooding over religious and hyper-ethical topics. In the end, excessive Imperialism drains people of their vitality, as it did the Romans. All this, as we have seen, is evident from the study of innumerable facts relating to the growth and spread of excessive Imperialism.

It is likewise clear that the most intense intellectual work and the most typical productions of the human mind and heart have invariably been found in small centres such as Athens, Syracuse, Florence, Geneva; or in countries that by reason of their extent or in view of their anti-imperialist spirit can under no condition be called Empires proper. Such countries were England herself in the times of the Tudors and the Stuarts; France at all times; the Southern and a few Central States of Germany, that have produced by far the greatest, in fact over ninety per cent., of Germany's great men; and a number of other small States in Europe. Not every small country of Europe has, for this reason alone, produced leaders of thought; but the great intellectual movements of Europe all came from small centres.

It is the unique and priceless advantage of Great

Britain to have been able to build up an Empire proper, and yet to preserve her original character as one of the small countries that by their very intensity are endowed with great possibilities and gifts counteracting the baneful consequences of excessive Imperialism.

Excessive Imperialism, we must make bold to repeat, does desiccate many a force of the human intellect and heart; so it has, at times and for shortened periods, done in England too. Yet only for a time. For even in one of the periods of triumphant Imperialism, England produced her Thomas Young, her Darwin.

Excessive Imperialism does unnature woman; so it has done to a certain extent in England too. Yet what dignity and womanly reserve are still to be found in Englishwomen! What modesty and calm disdain of all loud display! What true love are Englishwomen capable of devoting to their husbands.

Excessive Imperialism does drive people into an undue brooding over hyper-ethical and religious subjects; as it did the Romans; as it does the Americans and the Russians. So it has at all times the English. "Revivals" and "Evangelists," and morbid hatred of the most natural desires of men, have been and are but too rampant in England.

Yet it is in England where Keats, Shelley, Byron, Matthew Arnold, Swinburne, and a number of other great writers have, in accents of rapturous beauty, preached the gospel of Light and Grace and Tact.

On analysing these distinctive features of British greatness, as grounded upon the essentially dual character of British Imperialism, we cannot but see that it is British Individualism which is, as against the wholesale levelling predominant in all the other Empires, the saving force of British history. The desiccating and draining processes inherent in all the other types of Imperialism are all directed against strong individualism, and it is for this reason that excessive Imperialism defeats its own ends.

British Imperialism, then, as it is to-day, is the *juste milieu* between all the types of Imperialism hitherto developed by history. Is it necessary to alter this, its gloriously distinctive character? Is it necessary to hasten the process by which the moderation and fine proportionality of British Imperialism shall be disturbed and distorted? Is it really so urgent to dry up British intellect, to quite unwoman woman, and to hand over social life to the guidance of "Revivalists"? The man in the street, who instinctively dislikes the idea

of "*getting Americanised*," has long declared his staunch antagonism to excessive Imperialism.

That the excessive type of Imperialism is not needed for statesmanlike reasons, we have tried to show in the preceding pages. Is it, then, the irresistible desire of the citizens of Great and Greater Britain? Scarcely. Unless we misread the entire character of Britons of Great and Greater Britain, it is certain that the secular, historical individualism of the ruling people of the British Empire is at once their force and their pride. Any measure that tends to weaken this individualism; any proposal that means, intentionally or unconsciously, to tone down this sturdy and vigorous bent for differentiation, is undoubtedly not welcome to the majority of Britons.

Can there be any serious doubt that Imperialism, if carried on according to the ideas of latter-day protectionists, has a clear tendency to pull down those ramparts behind which British individualism has been flourishing these eight centuries? The British Empire, closed up against all the rest of the countries by the Chinese Wall of a Preferential Tariff, must inevitably develop those levelling forces that have, in other Empires, wrought such havoc with the most precious funds of human capital.

Empires do not subsist on money alone. They subsist on living forces of intellect, heart, emotion, character ; and it is precisely these true factors of life that will by excessive Imperialism be blighted and dwarfed. Why should the British Empire be represented by an "Imperial Parliament" comprising deputies from all the dominions of the Empire ? Why not continue, in keeping with British individualism, to have a series of Parliaments, each corresponding to the needs of its own organic part of the whole Empire ?

Why should the evident tendency to the cultivation of local idioms be discouraged ? It is infinitely more in harmony with the all-pervading principle of British history, to tolerate, perhaps to encourage, the rise of Welsh, Irish, and any other idiom helping to further Differentiation. As there is not, and should not be, One Law in the British Empire, so there should not be One Language ; nor One Tariff ; nor One Religion. All the questions necessarily subject to greater unification, such as the Army or the Navy, might very well be settled by Inter-Colonial Committees, by Imperial "Delegations." It is a mere question of technical detail.

But if there be any value in the study of history ; if the past can teach us anything worth

listening to whenever vital questions of National and Imperial Policy are under consideration,—it is to our mind certain that England's greatest treasure and force, is not in her Navy nor in her Wealth, but in that Individualism, which no doubt frequently exceeds its aim and turns angular and grotesque ; but on the whole constitutes an asset, a force greater than that of any other Empire. Karl Marx used to say that in the English there is much of the Romans and of the Carthaginians. It is truer to say that in the British there is much of the Romans and of the Athenians.

Nature and history, that is, the two greatest powers in space and time, have endowed England with chances and forces that bid fair to realise at least a portion of those ideals that have immortalised the Hellenes and the Romans. Shall any ambitious statesman be allowed to turn England away from her unique career and steer her into the path of excessive Imperialism destined to failure ?

Let each one of the British Colonies develop her own individuality, political, social, financial, and intellectual. The more intensely differentiated they will become, the better for them, the better for the Empire. An organically differentiated Colony can never and will never desire to become part either of a small whole, or of one of the other

levelled Empires. She will for ever have the feeling of her natural and necessary adhesion to and cohesion with that old and glorious country which alone of all Empires has known how to combine Freedom with Power, Intellect with Heart, Wealth with Art, Individualism with Patriotism.

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
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